On the Evolution of the Rules versus Discretion Debate
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- D E W Laidler, 2002. "Rules, Discretion and Financial Crises in Classical and Neoclassical Monetary Economics," Economic Issues Journal Articles, Economic Issues, vol. 7(2), pages 11-34, September.
- Barro, Robert J & Gordon, David B, 1983.
"A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 91(4), pages 589-610, August.
- Robert J. Barro & David B. Gordon, 1981. "A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural-Rate Model," NBER Working Papers 0807, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Calvo, Guillermo A, 1978. "On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1411-1428, November.
- Henry C. Simons, 1936. "Rules versus Authorities in Monetary Policy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 1-1.
- Nelson, Edward, 2020. "Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932–1972, Volume 2," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226684895, April.
- Goodhart, Charles & Jensen, Meinhard, 2015. "Currency School versus Banking School: an ongoing confrontation," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 64068, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
- Nelson, Edward, 2020. "Milton Friedman and Economic Debate in the United States, 1932–1972, Volume 1," University of Chicago Press Economics Books, University of Chicago Press, edition 1, number 9780226683775, April.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
- Eleftheriou, Maria & Kouretas, Georgios P., 2023. "Monetary policy rules and inflation control in the US," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 119(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Harris Dellas & George S. Tavlas, 2022. "Retrospectives: On the Evolution of the Rules versus Discretion Debate in Monetary Policy," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 36(3), pages 245-260, Summer.
- Jorge Enrique Restrepo Londono, 1998.
"Reglas monetarias en una economía pequena y abierta,"
Revista ESPE - Ensayos Sobre Política Económica, Banco de la República, vol. 17(33), pages 61-84, July.
- Jorge Enrique Restrepo Londoño, 1998. "Reglas monetarias en una economía pequeña y abierta," Revista ESPE - Ensayos sobre Política Económica, Banco de la Republica de Colombia, vol. 17(33), pages 61-84, June.
- Rhenals M., Remberto & Saldarriaga, Juan Pablo, 2008. "Una regla de Taylor óptima para Colombia, 1991-2006," Revista Lecturas de Economía, Universidad de Antioquia, CIE, November.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020.
"How macroeconomists lost control of stabilization policy: towards dark ages,"
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 27(6), pages 938-982, November.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How macroeconomists lost control of stabilization policy: towards dark ages," Post-Print halshs-03029894, HAL.
- Jean Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages," Papers 2010.00212, arXiv.org.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages," Working Papers halshs-02978527, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages," PSE Working Papers halshs-02978527, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard Chatelain & Kirsten Ralf, 2020. "How macroeconomists lost control of stabilization policy: towards dark ages," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-03029894, HAL.
- Jean-Bernard, Chatelain & Kirsten, Ralf, 2020. "How Macroeconomists Lost Control of Stabilization Policy: Towards Dark Ages," MPRA Paper 103244, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alberto Giovannini, 1993. "Bretton Woods and Its Precursors: Rules versus Discretion in the History of International Monetary Regimes," NBER Chapters, in: A Retrospective on the Bretton Woods System: Lessons for International Monetary Reform, pages 109-154, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fidelina B. Natividad-Carlos, 2013. "‘Time Inconsistency’: The Phillips Curve Example (An Analysis for Intermediate Macroeconomics)," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201307, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
- Tavlas, George S., 2021.
"A Reconsideration Of The Doctrinal Foundations Of Monetary Policy Rules: Fisher Versus Chicago,"
Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, vol. 43(1), pages 55-82, March.
- George S. Tavlas, 2019. "A reconsideration of the doctrinal foundations of monetary-policy rules: Fisher versus Chicago," Working Papers 273, Bank of Greece.
- Tavlas, George S. & Assistant, JHET, 2021. "A Reconsideration of the Doctrinal Foundations of Monetary-Policy Rules: Fisher versus Chicago," OSF Preprints ap7w9, Center for Open Science.
- Singleton,John, 2010. "Central Banking in the Twentieth Century," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521899093, September.
- Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2003.
"Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(4), pages 715-741.
- Stefania Albanesi & V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, "undated". "Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy," Working Papers 198, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2002. "Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy," Macroeconomics 0201004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2002. "Expectation traps and monetary policy," Working Paper Series WP-02-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
- Stefania Albanesi & V. V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2003. "Expectation traps and monetary policy," Staff Report 319, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- Stefania Albanesi & V.V. Chari & Lawrence J. Christiano, 2002. "Expectation Traps and Monetary Policy," NBER Working Papers 8912, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2011.
"The Optimality And Controllability Of Monetary Policy Through Delegation With Consistent Targets,"
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 58(1), pages 82-106, February.
- Huiping Yuan & Stephen M. Miller & Langnan Chen, 2006. "The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models," Working papers 2006-05, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jan 2009.
- Thomas F. Cargill & Federico Guerrero, 2007. "Japan's Deflation: A Time‐Inconsistent Policy in Need of an Inflation Target," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 115-130, July.
- Tatsuhito Kono & Naoki Kitamura & Kiyoshi Yamasaki & Kazuki Iwakami, 2016.
"Quantitative analysis of dynamic inconsistencies in infrastructure planning: an example of coastal levee improvement,"
Environment and Planning B, , vol. 43(2), pages 401-418, March.
- Kono, Tatsuhito & Kitamura, Naoki & Yamasaki, Kiyoshi & Iwakami, Kazuki, 2016. "Quantitative Analysis of Dynamic Inconsistencies in Infrastructure Planning: An example of coastal levee improvement," MPRA Paper 107920, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Alpanda, Sami & Honig, Adam, 2010. "Political monetary cycles and a de facto ranking of central bank independence," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(6), pages 1003-1023, October.
- Schaumburg, Ernst & Tambalotti, Andrea, 2007.
"An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy,"
Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 302-324, March.
- Ernst Schaumburg & Andrea Tambalotti, 2003. "An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy," Staff Reports 171, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Ernst Schaumburg & Andrea Tambalotti, 2003. "An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy," Macroeconomics 0302004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Andrea Tambalotti & Ernst Schaumburg, 2004. "An Investigation of the Gains from Commitment in Monetary Policy," Econometric Society 2004 North American Summer Meetings 282, Econometric Society.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2013.
"Fiscal Multipliers and Policy Coordination,"
Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 6, pages 175-234,
Central Bank of Chile.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2006. "Fiscal multipliers and policy coordination," Staff Reports 241, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Gauti B. Eggertsson, 2011. "Fiscal Multipliers and Policy Coordination," Working Papers Central Bank of Chile 628, Central Bank of Chile.
- Jensen Christian, 2020. "Discretion rather than rules? Outdated optimal commitment plans versus discretionary policymaking," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 20(1), pages 1-9, January.
- Akhand Akhtar Hossain, 2009. "Central Banking and Monetary Policy in the Asia-Pacific," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 12777.
- Carlos Scartascini & Mariano Tommasi & Ernesto Stein, 2010.
"Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs- An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy,"
Research Department Publications
4660, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
- Mariano Tommasi & Carlos Scartascini & Ernesto Stein, 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-offs. An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," Working Papers 101, Universidad de San Andres, Departamento de Economia, revised Mar 2010.
- Tommasi, Mariano & Scartascini, Carlos & Stein, Ernesto H., 2010. "Veto Players and Policy Trade-Offs: An Intertemporal Approach to Study the Effects of Political Institutions on Policy," IDB Publications (Working Papers) 1711, Inter-American Development Bank.
- Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005.
"Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank,"
NBER Working Papers
11792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp105, IIIS.
- Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2005. "Establishing credibility: evolving perceptions of the European Central Bank," Staff Reports 231, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
- Linda S. Goldberg & Michael W. Klein, 2007. "Establishing Credibility: Evolving Perceptions of the European Central Bank," The Institute for International Integration Studies Discussion Paper Series iiisdp194, IIIS.
- Franz R. Hahn & Peter Mooslechner, 1999. "Zur Fundierung des Designs des Europäischen Zentralbanksystems," WIFO Monatsberichte (monthly reports), WIFO, vol. 72(1), pages 49-60, January.
More about this item
Keywords
Rules versus discretion; Monetary policy; Modern debate; Chicago school; Currency school; Banking school;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- B22 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought since 1925 - - - Macroeconomics
- E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-CBA-2021-05-10 (Central Banking)
- NEP-HIS-2021-05-10 (Business, Economic and Financial History)
- NEP-HPE-2021-05-10 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MAC-2021-05-10 (Macroeconomics)
- NEP-MON-2021-05-10 (Monetary Economics)
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:15976. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.cepr.org .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.