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A Crash Course on the Euro Crisis

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Abstract

The financial crises of the last twenty years brought new economic concepts into classroom discussions. This article introduces undergraduate students and teachers to seven of these models: (i) misallocation of capital inflows, (ii) modern and shadow banks, (iii) strategic complementarities and amplification, (iv) debt contracts and the distinction between solvency and liquidity, (v) the diabolic loop, (vi) regional flights to safety, and (vii) unconventional monetary policy. We apply each of them to provide a full account of the euro crisis of 2010-12.

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  • Brunnermeier, Markus, 2019. "A Crash Course on the Euro Crisis," CEPR Discussion Papers 14016, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:14016
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    Cited by:

    1. Jéfferson Colombo & Peter Wanke & Jorge Antunes & Abul Kalam Azad, 2022. "Unveiling endogeneity between competition and efficiency in European banks: a robust econometric-neural network approach," SN Business & Economics, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 1-46, March.
    2. Mr. Anil Ari & Sophia Chen & Mr. Lev Ratnovski, 2019. "The Dynamics of Non-Performing Loans during Banking Crises: A New Database," IMF Working Papers 2019/272, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Yothin Jinjarak & Rashad Ahmed & Sameer Nair-Desai & Weining Xin & Joshua Aizenman, 2021. "Pandemic shocks and fiscal-monetary policies in the Eurozone: COVID-19 dominance during January–June 2020," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 73(4), pages 1557-1580.
    4. Niels Gilbert & Sebastiaan Pool, 2020. "Sectoral allocation and macroeconomic imbalances in EMU," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 156(4), pages 945-984, November.
    5. Antonia Díaz, 2021. "The EU Budget and the Role of Public Goods," CESifo Forum, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, vol. 22(02), pages 35-38, March.
    6. Economides, George & Papageorgiou, Dmitris & Philippopoulos, Apostolis, 2020. "Macroeconomic policy lessons from Greece," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 107155, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. George Economides & Dimitris Papageorgiou & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2020. "Macroeconomic Policy Lessons for Greece from the Debt Crisis," CESifo Working Paper Series 8188, CESifo.
    8. Júlia Király, 2020. "Hungary and Other Emerging EU Countries in the Financial Storm," Financial and Monetary Policy Studies, Springer, number 978-3-030-49544-2, December.
    9. Keita, Kady & Rabaud, Isabelle & Turcu, Camelia, 2023. "Fiscal outcomes, current account imbalances, and institutions in Europe: Exploring nonlinearities," International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 175(C), pages 121-134.
    10. Debrun, Xavier & Masuch, Klaus & Ferrero, Guiseppe & Vansteenkiste, Isabel & Ferdinandusse, Marien & von Thadden, Leopold & Hauptmeier, Sebastian & Alloza, Mario & Derouen, Chloé & Bańkowski, Krzyszto, 2021. "Monetary-fiscal policy interactions in the euro area," Occasional Paper Series 273, European Central Bank.
    11. Philip R. Lane, 2021. "The Resilience of the Euro," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 3-22, Spring.
    12. Maideu-Morera, Gerard, 2024. "Optimal Fiscal Rules and Macroprudential Policies with Sovereign Default Risk," TSE Working Papers 24-1534, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    13. Vasiliki Dimakopoulou & George Economides & Apostolis Philippopoulos, 2021. "The ECB's Policy, the Recovery Fund and the Importance of Trust: The Case of Greece," CESifo Working Paper Series 9371, CESifo.
    14. Ari, Anil & Chen, Sophia & Ratnovski, Lev, 2021. "The dynamics of non-performing loans during banking crises: A new database with post-COVID-19 implications," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 133(C).
    15. Antonia Díaz & Luis A. Puch, 2021. "EU After COVID-19: An Opportunity for Policy Coordination," Intereconomics: Review of European Economic Policy, Springer;ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics;Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), vol. 56(4), pages 197-200, July.
    16. Xuewen Liu, 2023. "A Model of Systemic Bank Runs," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 78(2), pages 731-793, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Teaching; Financial crisis; Shadow banking; Safe asset; Pecuniary externalities; Amplification; Systemic risk; Euro crisis;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F32 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Current Account Adjustment; Short-term Capital Movements
    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises

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