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Financial Fragility and the Keynesian Multiplier

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  • van Wijnbergen, Sweder
  • van der Kwaak, Christiaan

Abstract

We investigate the effectiveness of fiscal stimuli when banks are undercapitalized and have large holdings of government bonds subject to sovereign default risk. Deficit-financed government purchases then crowd out private expenditure and fiscal multipliers can turn negative. Crowding out increases for longer maturity bonds and higher sovereign default risk. We estimate a DSGE model with financial frictions for Spain and find that investment crowding out indeed leads to a negative cumulative fiscal multiplier. When monetary policy is exogenous, like at the ZLB or in a currency union, fiscal stimuli become more effective but multipliers are reduced when banks are undercapitalized.

Suggested Citation

  • van Wijnbergen, Sweder & van der Kwaak, Christiaan, 2017. "Financial Fragility and the Keynesian Multiplier," CEPR Discussion Papers 12394, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:12394
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Macrofinancial fragility; Sovereign default risk; Financial intermediation; Fiscal policy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General

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