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The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information

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  • Nöldeke, Georg
  • Peña, Jorge

Abstract

We characterize the symmetric Nash equilibria of the symmetric voter participation game with complete information introduced by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983). Our results confirm their conjecture on the existence, multiplicity, and comparative statics of such equilibria and yield more precise information on how changes in team size affect the location of equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Nöldeke, Georg & Peña, Jorge, 2015. "The symmetric equilibria of symmetric voter participation games with complete information," CEPR Discussion Papers 10751, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10751
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tilman Borgers, 2004. "Costly Voting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 57-66, March.
    2. Roger B. Myerson, 1998. "Population uncertainty and Poisson games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 27(3), pages 375-392.
    3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "On participation games with complete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 35(3), pages 337-352, February.
    4. Ian Jewitt, 1987. "Risk Aversion and the Choice Between Risky Prospects: The Preservation of Comparative Statics Results," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(1), pages 73-85.
    5. Stefano Demichelis & Amrita Dhillon, 2010. "Learning in Elections and Voter Turnout," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(5), pages 871-896, October.
    6. Thomas Palfrey & Howard Rosenthal, 1983. "A strategic calculus of voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 7-53, January.
    7. Amrita Dhillon & Susana Peralta, 2002. "Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 332-352, June.
    8. Timothy J. Feddersen, 2004. "Rational Choice Theory and the Paradox of Not Voting," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 18(1), pages 99-112, Winter.
    9. Indranil Chakraborty, 1999. "Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 723-733.
    10. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Rosenthal, Howard, 1985. "Voter Participation and Strategic Uncertainty," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 79(1), pages 62-78, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Peña, Jorge & Heifetz, Aviad & Nöldeke, Georg, 2024. "The shirker’s dilemma and the prospect of cooperation in large groups," Theoretical Population Biology, Elsevier, vol. 155(C), pages 10-23.
    2. Jorge Peña & Georg Nöldeke, 2023. "Cooperative Dilemmas with Binary Actions and Multiple Players," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 13(4), pages 1156-1193, December.
    3. Christos Mavridis & Marco Serena, 2018. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 177(1), pages 53-66, October.
    4. Yuval Salant & Josh Cherry, 2020. "Statistical Inference in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 88(4), pages 1725-1752, July.
    5. Mavridis, Christos & Serena, Marco, 2021. "Complete information pivotal-voter model with asymmetric group size and asymmetric benefits," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    6. Hans Peter Grüner & Thomas Tröger, 2019. "Linear Voting Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 87(6), pages 2037-2077, November.
    7. Michael Müller & Clemens Puppe, 2023. "Strategy-proofness implies minimal participation under single-peakedness," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 131-151, April.
    8. Thomas R Palfrey & Kirill Pogorelskiy, 2019. "Communication Among Voters Benefits the Majority Party," The Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 129(618), pages 961-990.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Costly voting; Mixed strategy equilibrium; Participation games; Polynomials in bernstein form;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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