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The value of explicit randomization in the tax code

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  • PESTIEAU, P.
  • POSSEN, U. M.
  • SLUTSKY, S. M.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Pestieau, P. & Possen, U. M. & Slutsky, S. M., 1998. "The value of explicit randomization in the tax code," LIDAM Reprints CORE 1300, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    • Handle: RePEc:cor:louvrp:1300
    Note: In : Journal of Public Economics, 67, 87-103, 1998
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1975. "The Deterrent Effect of Capital Punishment: A Question of Life and Death," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 65(3), pages 397-417, June.
    2. Harris, John R, 1970. "On the Economics of Law and Order," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 78(1), pages 165-174, Jan.-Feb..
    3. Brito, Dagobert L. & Hamilton, Jonathan H. & Slutsky, Steven M. & Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1995. "Randomization in optimal income tax schedules," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(2), pages 189-223, February.
    4. Weiss, Laurence, 1976. "The Desirability of Cheating Incentives and Randomness in the Optimal Income Tax," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 84(6), pages 1343-1352, December.
    5. repec:bla:econom:v:48:y:1981:i:191:p:235-50 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. repec:bla:econom:v:46:y:1979:i:182:p:137-47 is not listed on IDEAS
    7. Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1982. "Self-selection and Pareto efficient taxation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 213-240, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jordi Caballé & Judith Panadés, 2005. "Cost Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 12(3), pages 239-263, May.
    2. Slemrod, Joel & Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Optimal observability in a linear income tax," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 108(2), pages 105-108, August.
    3. Hines Jr., James R. & Keen, Michael J., 2021. "Certain effects of random taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 203(C).
    4. Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2001. "Who participates in tax amnesties? Self-selection of risk-averse taxpayers," POLIS Working Papers 21, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
    5. Carla Marchese & Fabio Privileggi, 2004. "Tax Amnesties and the Self-Selection of Risk-Averse Taxpayers," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 18(3), pages 319-341, December.
    6. James R. Hines Jr. & Michael Keen, 2018. "Certain Effects of Uncertain Taxes," NBER Working Papers 25388, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Jean-Louis Arcand & Grégoire Rota Graziosi, 2005. "Tax Compliance and Rank Dependent Expected Utility," The Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Association for the Study of Insurance Economics (The Geneva Association), vol. 30(1), pages 57-69, June.
    8. Florian Ederer & Richard Holden & Margaret Meyer, 2018. "Gaming and strategic opacity in incentive provision," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 49(4), pages 819-854, December.
    9. Leandro Arozamena & Martin Besfamille & Pablo Sanguinetti, 2010. "Optimal taxes and penalties when the government cannot commit to its audit policy," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-10, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella.
    10. Pierre Pestieau & Uri M. Possen & Steven M. Slutsky, 2004. "Jointly Optimal Taxes and Enforcement Policies in Response to Tax Evasion," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 6(2), pages 337-374, May.

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