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La réglementation incitative

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  • Marcel Boyer

Abstract

This study presents the foundations and objectives of business regulation in Canada. An overview of the main theoretical findings in regulatory economics over the past 10 years and a price-cap analysis of regulation introduced in England in 1984 provide key lessons and recommendations for improving the effectiveness of regulatory mechanisms in Canada: promote deregulation, promote price-cap regulation in full disclosure contexts, promote price-cap regulation with marked competition in incomplete disclosure contexts where the existence of information annuities can be tolerated, promote incentive regulation with marked competition in incomplete disclosure contexts where the existence of information annuities is difficult to accept, and finally establish an appropriate body, independent of governments and regulated companies, to review regulation and to inform and educate the public about these changes. Cette étude présente les fondements et les objectifs de la réglementation des entreprises au Canada. Un survol des principaux résultats théoriques en économie de la réglementation depuis les 10 dernières années et une analyse de la réglementation du type price-cap introduite en Angleterre en 1984 permet de dégager les leçons et les recommandations essentielles pour améliorer l'efficacité des mécanismes de réglementation au Canada : favoriser la déréglementation, favoriser la réglementation price-cap dans les contextes d'information complète, favoriser la réglementation price-cap avec concurrence balisée dans les contextes d'information incomplète où l'existence de rentes informationnelles peut être tolérée, favoriser la réglementation incitative avec concurrence balisée dans les contextes d'information incomplète où l'existence de rentes informationnelles est difficilement acceptable, et finalement mettre sur pied un organisme adéquat, indépendant des gouvernements et des entreprises réglementées, chargé de revoir la réglementation et d'informer et d'éduquer le public sur ces changements.

Suggested Citation

  • Marcel Boyer, 1995. "La réglementation incitative," CIRANO Papers 95c-01, CIRANO.
    • Handle: RePEc:cir:circah:95c-01
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    File URL: https://cirano.qc.ca/files/publications/95c-01.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Schmalensee, 1989. "Good Regulatory Regimes," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 417-436, Autumn.
    2. Baumol, William J & Bradford, David F, 1970. "Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 60(3), pages 265-283, June.
    3. Boyer, Marcel & Laffont, Jean-Jacques, 1997. "Environmental risks and bank liability," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 41(8), pages 1427-1459, August.
    4. David Sibley, 1989. "Asymmetric Information, Incentives and Price-Cap Regulation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 20(3), pages 392-404, Autumn.
    5. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
    6. Douglas W. Caves & Laurits R. Christensen & Joseph A. Swanson, 1981. "Economic Performance in Regulated and Unregulated Environments: A Comparison of U. S. and Canadian Railroads," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 96(4), pages 559-581.
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    Cited by:

    1. Marcel Boyer & Jacques Robert, 1997. "Competition and Access in Electricity Markets: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-41, CIRANO.
    2. Marcel Boyer, 1997. "Competition and Access in Telecoms: ECPR, Global Price Cap, and Auctions," CIRANO Working Papers 97s-03, CIRANO.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Incentive regulation; Réglementation incitative;

    JEL classification:

    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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