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Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization between Equally Competitive Spouses

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Listed:
  • Spencer Bastani
  • Lisa Dickmanns
  • Thomas Giebe
  • Oliver Gürtler

Abstract

We analyze equally competitive spouses competing for promotion in their respective workplaces and show that an asymmetric equilibrium featuring household specialization can arise. Examples where the asymmetric equilibrium is welfare-superior to the symmetric equilibrium are highlighted. By investing heavily in the career of only one spouse, families reduce the intensity of the rat race of the working environment and obtain less risky consumption opportunities. Our findings suggest that specialization can reflect an efficient response to the competitiveness of the labor market and may arise even when all workers have equal opportunities to succeed in the labor market.

Suggested Citation

  • Spencer Bastani & Lisa Dickmanns & Thomas Giebe & Oliver Gürtler, 2022. "Competition for Promotion Can Induce Household Specialization between Equally Competitive Spouses," CESifo Working Paper Series 9660, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_9660
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    contest theory; gender equality; family; household; competition;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D13 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Household Production and Intrahouse Allocation
    • J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
    • J71 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor Discrimination - - - Hiring and Firing
    • M51 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Firm Employment Decisions; Promotions
    • M52 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Personnel Economics - - - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects

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