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An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection

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  • Franziska Tausch
  • Jan Potters
  • Arno Riedl

Abstract

Does adverse selection hamper the effectiveness of voluntary risk sharing? How do differences in risk profiles affect adverse selection? We experimentally investigate individuals’ willingness to share risks with others. Across treatments we vary how risk profiles differ between individuals. We find strong evidence for adverse selection if individuals risk profiles can be ranked according to first-order stochastic dominance and only little evidence for adverse selection if risk profiles can only be ranked on the basis of second-order stochastic dominance. We observe the same pattern also for anticipated adverse selection. These results suggest that the degree to which adverse selection erodes voluntary risk sharing arrangements crucially depends on the form of risk heterogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • Franziska Tausch & Jan Potters & Arno Riedl, 2013. "An Experimental Investigation of Risk Sharing and Adverse Selection," CESifo Working Paper Series 4192, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4192
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    Cited by:

    1. Cettolin, Elena & Tausch, Franziska, 2016. "Risk taking and risk sharing: does responsibility matter? (RM/13/045-revised-)," Research Memorandum 018, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    2. Asadul Islam & C. Matthew Leister & Minhaj Mahmud & Paul A. Raschky, 2020. "Natural disaster and risk-sharing behavior: Evidence from rural Bangladesh," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 61(1), pages 67-99, August.
    3. Schlag, Karl H. & van der Weele, Joël J., 2015. "A method to elicit beliefs as most likely intervals," Judgment and Decision Making, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(5), pages 456-468, September.
    4. Elena Cettolin & Franziska Tausch, 2015. "Risk taking and risk sharing: Does responsibility matter?," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 50(3), pages 229-248, June.
    5. repec:cup:judgdm:v:10:y:2015:i:5:p:456-468 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Andreas Richter & Jörg Schiller & Harris Schlesinger, 2014. "Behavioral insurance: Theory and experiments," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 85-96, April.
    7. Ronald Peeters & Leonard Wolk, 2017. "Eliciting interval beliefs: An experimental study," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 12(4), pages 1-15, April.
    8. Maria Carannante & Valeria D’amato & Steven Haberman & Massimiliano Menzietti, 2024. "Frailty-based mortality models and reserving for longevity risk," The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance - Issues and Practice, Palgrave Macmillan;The Geneva Association, vol. 49(2), pages 320-339, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    adverse selection; risk sharing; experiments; risk heterogeneity;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior

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