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The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Delcentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam

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  • Thanh Thuy Vu
  • Messaoud Zouikri
  • Bruno Deffains

Abstract

Formal and informal institutions are often viewed as complements or substitutes in empirical and theoretical works. However, no evidence of complementarities or substitutes is found in our empirical analysis of the interrelation between formal and informal decentralization across 64 provinces of Vietnam. This paper finds that the formally decentralized system of public service supply is accommodating the informal one, but informal decentralization in public order provision tends to compete with the existing ineffective formal system. This implies that the central government needs to reorganize the system of decentralizing the provision of public goods/services and public in order to make informal institutions complementary rather than rival or free-riding on formal ones.

Suggested Citation

  • Thanh Thuy Vu & Messaoud Zouikri & Bruno Deffains, 2012. "The Interrelationship between Formal and Informal Delcentralization and its Impact on Sub-Central Governance Performance: The Case of Vietnam," CESifo Working Paper Series 3714, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3714
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Lily - Trinh Hoang Hong Hue, 2019. "Gender Differences of Citizen Participation in Local Government: The Case of Vietnam," Journal of Public Administration and Governance, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(3), pages 225-238, December.
    2. Libman Alexander & Feld Lars P., 2013. "Strategic Tax Collection and Fiscal Decentralization: The Case of Russia," German Economic Review, De Gruyter, vol. 14(4), pages 449-482, December.
    3. Choudhury, Sanchari, 2015. "Governmental decentralization and corruption revisited: Accounting for potential endogeneity," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 218-222.
    4. Alexander Libman, 2015. "Words or deeds: what matters? On the role of symbolic action in political decentralization," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 49(3), pages 801-838, November.
    5. Sad Dian Utomo & Irfan Ridwan Maksum & Teguh Kurniawan, 2023. "The Institutional Dynamics of Sub-District in Indonesia," Technium Social Sciences Journal, Technium Science, vol. 43(1), pages 1-36, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    formal decentralization; informal decentralization; sub-central governance; accommodating; and competing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
    • H83 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Public Administration
    • K00 - Law and Economics - - General - - - General (including Data Sources and Description)

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