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When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy

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  • Giorgio Bellettini
  • Carlotta Berti Ceroni

Abstract

This paper studies the determinants of immigration policy in an economy with entrepreneurs and workers where a trade union has monopoly power over wages. The presence of the union leads a benevolent government to implement a high level of immigration and induces a welfare loss not only from an aggregate point of view, but even from the point of view of workers. In the politico-economic equilibrium where interest groups lobby for immigration, we show the condition under which workers are no longer hurt by the presence of the union.

Suggested Citation

  • Giorgio Bellettini & Carlotta Berti Ceroni, 2005. "When the Union Hurts the Workers: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy," CESifo Working Paper Series 1421, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1421
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • F22 - International Economics - - International Factor Movements and International Business - - - International Migration
    • J51 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Trade Unions: Objectives, Structure, and Effects
    • J61 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Geographic Labor Mobility; Immigrant Workers

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