An Economist's Guide to U.S. v. Microsoft
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References listed on IDEAS
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- Toshifumi Kuroda & Teppei Koguchi & Takanori Ida, 2017. "Identifying the Effect of Mobile Operating Systems on the Mobile Services Market," Discussion papers e-17-004, Graduate School of Economics , Kyoto University.
- Oliver Budzinski, 2009. "Modern Industrial Economics and Competition Policy: Open Problems and Possible Limits," Working Papers 93/09, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
- Erwin Blackstone & John Roccili & Joseph Fuhr, 2002. "Winners, Losers, and Microsoft: Competition and Antitrust in High Technology Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 1999, pp. 288," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(4), pages 433-441, December.
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- Niedermayer, Andras, 2013. "On platforms, incomplete contracts, and open source software," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(6), pages 714-722.
- Pollock, Rufus, 2009. "The Control of Porting in Platform Markets," The Journal of Economic Asymmetries, Elsevier, vol. 6(2), pages 155-180.
- Oliver Budzinski, 2008. "A Note on Competing Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust Cases: Can the Best Be Identified?," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200803, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
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More about this item
Keywords
Microsoft; antitrust policy; monopolization; predation; network; L12; L41; K21;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
- L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
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