IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/bny/wpaper/0019.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Petro Populism

Author

Listed:
  • Egil Matsen
  • Gisle J. Natvik
  • Ragnar Torvik

Abstract

We aim to explain petro populism - the excessive use of oil revenues to buy political support. To reap the full gains of natural resource income politicians need to remain in office over time. Hence, even a rent-seeking incumbent who prioritizes his own welfare above that of citizens, will want to provide voters with goods and services if it promotes his probability of remaining in office. While this incentive benefits citizens under the rule of rent-seekers, it also has the adverse effect of motivating benevolent policymakers to short-term overprovision of goods and services. In equilibrium politicians of all types indulge in excessive resource extraction, while voters reward policies they realize cannot be sustained over time.

Suggested Citation

  • Egil Matsen & Gisle J. Natvik & Ragnar Torvik, 2014. "Petro Populism," Working Papers No 1/2014, Centre for Applied Macro- and Petroleum economics (CAMP), BI Norwegian Business School.
  • Handle: RePEc:bny:wpaper:0019
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.bi.edu/globalassets/forskning/camp/working-papers/2014/working_camp_1-2014.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgy Egorov & Konstantin Sonin, 2013. "A Political Theory of Populism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 128(2), pages 771-805.
    2. Hamilton, Kirk & Clemens, Michael, 1999. "Genuine Savings Rates in Developing Countries," The World Bank Economic Review, World Bank, vol. 13(2), pages 333-356, May.
    3. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2006. "Political foundations of the resource curse," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 447-468, April.
    4. Jesus Crespo Cuaresma & Harald Oberhofer & Paul Raschky, 2011. "Oil and the duration of dictatorships," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 148(3), pages 505-530, September.
    5. Torsten Persson & Lars E. O. Svensson, 1989. "Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 104(2), pages 325-345.
    6. Benjamin Smith, 2004. "Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(2), pages 232-246, April.
    7. Frederick van der Ploeg, 2011. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 49(2), pages 366-420, June.
    8. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2014. "Political foundations of the resource curse: A simplification and a comment," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 194-198.
    9. Frankel, Jeffrey A., 2010. "The Natural Resource Curse: A Survey," Scholarly Articles 4454156, Harvard Kennedy School of Government.
    10. Goryunov, Eugene & Kazakova, Marija & Kotlikoff, Laurence J. & Mamedov, Arseny & Nesterova, Kristina & Nazarov, Vladimir & Grišina, Elena & Trunin, Pavel V. & Shpenev, Alexey, 2013. "Russia's Fiscal Gap," EconStor Preprints 121938, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics.
      • Eugene Goryunov & Maria Kazakova & Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Arseny Mamedov & Kristina Nesterova & Vladimir Nazarov & Elena Grishina & Pavel Trunin & Alexey Shpenev, 2013. "Russia's Fiscal Gap," NBER Working Papers 19608, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00979099 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 1990. "A Positive Theory of Fiscal Deficits and Government Debt," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(3), pages 403-414.
    13. Egorov, Georgy & Guriev, Sergei & Sonin, Konstantin, 2009. "Why Resource-poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 103(4), pages 645-668, November.
    14. Kenneth Rogoff & Anne Sibert, 1988. "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 55(1), pages 1-16.
    15. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2013. "Oil and political survival," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 89-106.
    16. Deacon, Robert T., 2011. "The Political Economy of the Natural Resource Curse: A Survey of Theory and Evidence," Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 7(2), pages 111-208, December.
    17. Eric Maskin & Jean Tirole, 2004. "The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(4), pages 1034-1054, September.
    18. Torfinn Harding & Frederick Ploeg, 2013. "Official forecasts and management of oil windfalls," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 20(5), pages 827-866, October.
    19. Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1989. "Social Conflict and Populist Policies in Latin America," NBER Working Papers 2897, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Iacono, Roberto, 2017. "A comparison of fiscal rules for resource-rich economies," Economic Analysis and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 55(C), pages 179-193.
    2. Tania Masi & Roberto Ricciuti, 2016. "Oil discoveries and democracy," WIDER Working Paper Series 057, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Ahmed Mahmud & Syed Basher, 2014. "Price volatility and the political economy of resource-rich nations," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 253-279, August.
    4. Petar Stankov, 2018. "The Political Economy of Populism: An Empirical Investigation," Comparative Economic Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Association for Comparative Economic Studies, vol. 60(2), pages 230-253, June.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Michael Goujon And Aristide Mabali, 2016. "The Different Impacts Of Different Types Of Natural Resources On Political Institutions In Developing Countries," Journal of Economic Development, Chung-Ang Unviersity, Department of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 1-20, September.
    2. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2020. "Resource windfalls and public debt: A political economy perspective," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 123(C).
    3. Ohad Raveh & Yacov Tsur, 2018. "Resource Windfalls and Public Debt: The Role of Political Myopia," OxCarre Working Papers 205, Oxford Centre for the Analysis of Resource Rich Economies, University of Oxford.
    4. Carl Henrik Knutsen & Andreas Kotsadam & Eivind Hammersmark Olsen & Tore Wig, 2017. "Mining and Local Corruption in Africa," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 61(2), pages 320-334, April.
    5. Andersen, Jørgen Juel & Aslaksen, Silje, 2013. "Oil and political survival," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 89-106.
    6. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2018. "The resource curse literature as seen through the appropriability lens: a critical survey," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 175(3), pages 393-428, June.
    7. Raveh, Ohad & Tsur, Yacov, 2023. "Can resource windfalls reduce corruption? The role of term limits," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    8. Phoebe W. Ishak & Mohammad Reza Farzanegan, 2022. "Oil price shocks, protest, and the shadow economy: Is there a mitigation effect?," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 34(2), pages 298-321, July.
    9. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," CEPN Working Papers 2017-14, Centre d'Economie de l'Université de Paris Nord.
    10. Konte, Maty & Vincent, Rose Camille, 2021. "Mining and quality of public services: The role of local governance and decentralization," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    11. Jorge Gallego & Stanislao Maldonado & Lorena Trujillo, 2018. "Blessing a Curse? Institutional Reform and Resource Booms in Colombia," Working Papers 122, Peruvian Economic Association.
    12. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 2019. "Pandering and pork-barrel politics," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 176(C), pages 79-93.
    13. Mehrdad Vahabi, 2017. "A critical survey of the resource curse literature through the appropriability lens," CEPN Working Papers hal-01583559, HAL.
    14. Robinson, James A. & Torvik, Ragnar & Verdier, Thierry, 2017. "The political economy of public income volatility: With an application to the resource curse," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 243-252.
    15. Chandan Sharma & Ritesh Kumar Mishra, 2022. "On the Good and Bad of Natural Resource, Corruption, and Economic Growth Nexus," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 82(4), pages 889-922, August.
    16. Le Clech, Néstor A., 2024. "Policy market orientation, property rights, and corruption effects on the rent of non-renewable resources in Latin America and the Caribbean," Resources Policy, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    17. Eoin McGuirk, 2013. "The illusory leader: natural resources, taxation and accountability," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 154(3), pages 285-313, March.
    18. Adrian Boos & Karin Holm‐Müller, 2012. "A theoretical overview of the relationship between the resource curse and genuine savings as an indicator for “weak” sustainability," Natural Resources Forum, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 36(3), pages 145-159, August.
    19. Yawovi Mawussé Isaac Amedanou & Yannick Bouterige & Bertrand Laporte, 2023. "Institutional and political drivers for copper government take: new evidence for African and Latin American countries," CERDI Working papers hal-04213102, HAL.
    20. Klomp, Jeroen & de Haan, Jakob, 2016. "Election cycles in natural resource rents: Empirical evidence," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 79-93.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    resource curse; political economy;

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • O13 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Agriculture; Natural Resources; Environment; Other Primary Products
    • Q33 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Nonrenewable Resources and Conservation - - - Resource Booms (Dutch Disease)

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bny:wpaper:0019. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Helene Olsen (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/cambino.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.