A model of the IMF as a coinsurance arrangement
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- Shim, Ilhyock & Sharma, Sunil & Chami, Ralph, 2008. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics - The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal (2007-2020), Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel), vol. 2, pages 1-41.
- Chami, Ralph & Sharma, Sunil & Shim, Ilhyock, 2007. "A Model of the IMF as a Coinsurance Arrangement," Economics Discussion Papers 2007-26, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Mr. Ralph Chami & Mr. Ilhyock Shim & Mr. Sunil Sharma, 2004. "A Model of the Imf As a Coinsurance Arrangement," IMF Working Papers 2004/219, International Monetary Fund.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Barry Eichengreen & Poonam Gupta & Ashoka Mody, 2008.
"Sudden Stops and IMF-Supported Programs,"
NBER Chapters, in: Financial Markets Volatility and Performance in Emerging Markets, pages 219-266,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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- Suman Basu & Ran Bi & Prakash Kannan, 2010.
"Regional reserve pooling arrangements,"
Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, issue Oct.
- Ran Bi & Prakash Kannan & Suman Sambha Basu, 2010. "Regional Reserve Pooling Arrangements," 2010 Meeting Papers 675, Society for Economic Dynamics.
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"A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality,"
IMF Working Papers
2008/236, International Monetary Fund.
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"Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?,"
Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 18(1), pages 27-52, February.
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- Barry Eichengreen, 2006. "Insurance Underwriter or Financial Development Fund: What Role for Reserve Pooling in Latin America?," NBER Working Papers 12451, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anna Ivanova, 2006. "Outcomes-Based Conditionality: Its Role and Optimal Design," IMF Working Papers 2006/128, International Monetary Fund.
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More about this item
Keywords
IMF; coinsurance arrangement; conditionality; moral hazard; Samaritan's dilemma; King Lear's dilemma;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- F02 - International Economics - - General - - - International Economic Order and Integration
- F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
- G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
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