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Die Haftung des Wirtschaftsprüfers am Primär- und am Sekundärmarkt - eine rechtsökonomische Analyse

Author

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  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer

    (University of Hamburg, Germany)

  • Jochen Bigus

    (Universität Osnabrück)

Abstract

Ein fehlerhaftes Testat führt oft zur Überbewertung des Unternehmens. Auf dem Sekundärmarkt, d.h. bei der Abschlussprüfung eines bereits börsennotierten Unternehmens, weiß ein uninformierter Anleger ex-ante nicht, ob er Käufer oder Verkäufer überteuerter Aktien sein wird. Er kann einen Schaden erleiden, aber auch vom fehlerhaften Testat profitieren.Bei einem Börsengang (Primärmarkt) weiß der uninformierte Anleger hingegen ex-ante genau, dass er auf der Käuferseite steht und bei einem fehlerhaften Te-stat verliert. Daher ist der Anleger auf dem Primärmarkt an einem höheren Schutzniveau interessiert. Die vorliegende Untersuchung ergibt keine Gründe, bei der Haftung auf dem Primärmarkt andere Maßstäbe für die Sorgfalt des Wirtschaftsprüfers zu befürworten als sie generell im Vertrags- und Deliktsrecht bestehen, nämlich eine Haftung für einfache Fahrlässigkeit. Am Sekundärmarkt führt eine Dritthaftung bei Fahrlässigkeit zu übermäßiger Haftung, da der zu ersetzende Verlust der geschädigten Anleger den Schaden der Anlegergemeinschaft übersteigt. Eine Übermaßhaftung kann übermäßige Sorg-faltsanstrengungen des Prüfers induzieren. Um eine Überabschreckung am Sekundärmarkt zu vermeiden, sollte der Haf-tungsumfang daher auf den Schaden der Anlegergemeinschaft (des Unterneh-mens) beschränkt sein. Eine Alternative zur Begrenzung des Haftungsumfangs kann darin bestehen, in besonderen Ausnahmefällen die Haftungsvoraussetzung auf grobe Fahrlässigkeit zu reduzieren.

Suggested Citation

  • Hans-Bernd Schäfer & Jochen Bigus, "undated". "Die Haftung des Wirtschaftsprüfers am Primär- und am Sekundärmarkt - eine rechtsökonomische Analyse," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1122, Berkeley Electronic Press.
  • Handle: RePEc:bep:dewple:2005-1-1122
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics
    • K - Law and Economics
    • G - Financial Economics

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