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Who is Selling You Chiquilitros of Gasoline? Evidence From a Public Disclosure Policy

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  • Guerrero Santiago

Abstract

This paper estimates the impacts of disclosing information online and through the newspapers of gas stations that violate fuel supplying standards in Mexico. Using data from inspection histories, it finds that disclosing information online decreases the probability that any gas station would be found in violation in subsequent periods. Gas stations exposed in the newspapers are estimated to decrease their sales at the month of the newspaper publication. This effect fades with time and is not significant for subsequent months. The paper shows that public disclosure mechanisms can complement enforcement effort in contexts where institutions are weak.

Suggested Citation

  • Guerrero Santiago, 2012. "Who is Selling You Chiquilitros of Gasoline? Evidence From a Public Disclosure Policy," Working Papers 2012-04, Banco de México.
    • Handle: RePEc:bdm:wpaper:2012-04
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    File URL: https://www.banxico.org.mx/publications-and-press/banco-de-mexico-working-papers/%7B2E957C10-95E1-009F-DF5B-23CA938993C8%7D.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Julio César Arteaga & Daniel Flores, 2022. "Price Regulation and Fraud—with Special Emphasis on Gasoline Retailing," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 60(2), pages 175-192, March.
    2. Xian Liu & Barrett Kirwan & Andrea Martens, 2018. "Regulatory compliance, information disclosure and peer effects: evidence from the Mexican gasoline market," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 54(1), pages 53-80, August.
    3. Campa, Pamela, 2018. "Press and leaks: Do newspapers reduce toxic emissions?," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 184-202.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • K32 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Energy, Environmental, Health, and Safety Law
    • L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation

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