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Documento de Trabalho 02/2019 - Probabilidade de investigação e aplicação de medidas antidumping para a indústria brasileira: Efeitos para a concorrência

Author

Listed:
  • Sérgio Kannebley Júnior

    (Universidade de São Paulo)

  • Glauco Avelino Sampaio Oliveira

    (Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Departamento de Estudos Econômicos)

Abstract

Aborda a relação entre a concorrência nos mercados e as medidas de política que visam conceder a empresas nacionais uma isenção de pressões competitivas externas.

Suggested Citation

  • Sérgio Kannebley Júnior & Glauco Avelino Sampaio Oliveira, 2019. "Documento de Trabalho 02/2019 - Probabilidade de investigação e aplicação de medidas antidumping para a indústria brasileira: Efeitos para a concorrência," Documentos de Trabalho 2019020, Conselho Administrativo de Defesa Econômica (Cade), Departamento de Estudos Econômicos.
    • Handle: RePEc:atg:wpaper:2019020
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Vinícius de Azevedo Couto Firme & Cláudio R. Fóffano Vasconcelos, 2015. "Evolution in the use of antidumping mechanism after Uruguay round," Economia, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pós-Graduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics], vol. 16(3), pages 321-342.
    2. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-850, September.
    3. James P. Durling & Thomas J. Prusa, 2021. "Using safeguard protection to raise domestic rivals’ costs," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Thomas J Prusa (ed.), Economic Effects of Antidumping, chapter 13, pages 273-294, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. J.M. Finger & H. Keith Hall & Douglas R. Nelson, 2002. "The Political Economy of Administered Protection," Chapters, in: Institutions and Trade Policy, chapter 8, pages 81-95, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Gunnar Niels, 2000. "What is Antidumping Policy Really About?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(4), pages 467-492, September.
    6. Vinícius de Azevedo Couto Firme & Cláudio R. Fóffano Vasconcelos & Rogério Silva de Mattos, 2018. "The effect of macroeconomic variables on the opening of antidumping measures: A robust analysis for Brazilian and Argentine economy," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 22(1), pages 434-457, February.
    7. Laura Rovegno, 2013. "Trade protection and market power: evidence from US antidumping and countervailing duties," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer;Institut für Weltwirtschaft (Kiel Institute for the World Economy), vol. 149(3), pages 443-476, September.
    8. repec:bla:jecsur:v:14:y:2000:i:4:p:467-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    9. Nelson, Douglas, 2006. "The political economy of antidumping: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 554-590, September.
    10. Bown, Chad P. & McCulloch, Rachel, 2012. "Antidumping and market competition: implications for emerging economies," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6197, The World Bank.
    11. Konings, Jozef & Vandenbussche, Hylke, 2005. "Antidumping protection and markups of domestic firms," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 151-165, January.
    12. Carolyn L. Evans & Shane M. Sherlund, 2011. "Are Antidumping Duties for Sale? Case-Level Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale Model," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 78(2), pages 330-357, October.
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