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Dynamic Signals

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  • Mark Whitmeyer
  • Cole Williams

Abstract

In this paper, we reveal that the signal representation of information introduced by Gentzkow and Kamenica (2017) can be applied profitably to dynamic decision problems. We use this to characterize when one dynamic information structure is more valuable to an agent than another, irrespective of what other dynamic sources of information the agent may possess. Notably, this robust dominance is equivalent to an intuitive dynamic version of Brooks, Frankel, and Kamenica (2022)'s reveal-or-refine condition.

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  • Mark Whitmeyer & Cole Williams, 2024. "Dynamic Signals," Papers 2407.16648, arXiv.org.
    • Handle: RePEc:arx:papers:2407.16648
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Gentzkow, Matthew & Kamenica, Emir, 2017. "Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 411-429.
    2. Mark Whitmeyer & Cole Williams, 2024. "Comparisons of Sequential Experiments for Additively Separable Problems," Papers 2405.13709, arXiv.org.
    3. Börgers, Tilman & Hernando-Veciana, Angel & Krähmer, Daniel, 2013. "When are signals complements or substitutes?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(1), pages 165-195.
    4. Deb, Rahul & Renou, Ludovic, 2021. "Dynamic Choice and Common Learning," CEPR Discussion Papers 16160, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Ludovic Renou & Xavier Venel, 2024. "Comparing experiments in discounted problems," Papers 2405.16458, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    6. Alexander Frankel & Emir Kamenica, 2019. "Quantifying Information and Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(10), pages 3650-3680, October.
    7. de Oliveira, Henrique, 2018. "Blackwell's informativeness theorem using diagrams," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 126-131.
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