Can Health Spending Be Reined In through Supply Constraints? An Evaluation of Certificate-of-Need Laws
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- Thomas Stratmann & Markus Bjoerkheim & Christopher Koopman, 2024. "The Causal Effect of Repealing Certificate-of-Need Laws for Ambulatory Surgical Centers: Does Access to Medical Services Increase?," Papers 2405.08160, arXiv.org.
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