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Share Leasing And Production Efficiency

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  • Bernat, G. Andrew, Jr.

Abstract

This report reviews the current economic literature 'on the relationship between type of land lease and agricultural resource allocation. Current economic theory of land leasing does not provide a completely satisfactory explanation of lease choice in U.S. agriculture primarily because of deficiencies in the treatment of bargaining and part-owner operators. In addition, results from the literature on the principal-agent problem and on implicit contracts have not been fully exploited in the landleasing literature.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernat, G. Andrew, Jr., 1987. "Share Leasing And Production Efficiency," Staff Reports 278000, United States Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service.
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:uerssr:278000
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.278000
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Cited by:

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    2. Américo Mendes, 2005. "A Game Theoretical Model of Land Contract Choice," Game Theory and Information 0503001, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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