Learning process in marketing contract choice: the case of cereals in the Paris Basin

In the last two decades, the institutional environment of European cereal markets remarkably evolved, faced to the deregulation of the agricultural common markets and the subsequent emergence of new forms of internal and external competition. Until the beginning of the 20th century, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was implemented as a buffer protecting producers against price volatility on international commodity markets thanks to guaranteed floor prices. Since the reform of this regulation, we observe the development of various types of contracts aiming at managing risk and uncertainty for the different stakeholders in the chain. This article aims to contribute to the scarce empirical literature dealing with marketing contract choices. Drawing on a large original data base describing the transactions between cereal producers and a French cooperative over 10 years (2007-2016) in the Paris Basin, we describe the strategies of producers and conclude that inertial behaviors are a very important factor explaining marketing choices. However, determinants relative to quality and performance matter, in an increasingly competitive international context. Acknowledgement :