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A Statistical Study Of Federal Antitrust Enforcement In The Food And Fiber System: The Reagan Reforms

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  • Preston, Warren P.

Abstract

This paper documents recent trends in antitrust enforcement within the food and fiber system. Data obtained under Freedom of Information Act requests indicate that regulatory reforms precipitated steady declines in Federal Trade Commission resources directed toward agricultural industries. Department of Justice antitrust efforts exhibit a less identifiable pattern of change.

Suggested Citation

  • Preston, Warren P., 1988. "A Statistical Study Of Federal Antitrust Enforcement In The Food And Fiber System: The Reagan Reforms," 1988 Annual Meeting, August 1-3, Knoxville, Tennessee 270205, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea88:270205
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.270205
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Posner, Richard A, 1970. "A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 13(2), pages 365-419, October.
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