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The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game

In: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty

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  • Dale T. Mortensen

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  • Dale T. Mortensen, 1982. "The Matching Process as a Noncooperative Bargaining Game," NBER Chapters, in: The Economics of Information and Uncertainty, pages 233-258, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:4437
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Dale T. Mortensen, 1978. "Specific Capital and Labor Turnover," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 9(2), pages 572-586, Autumn.
    2. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    3. Diamond, Peter & Maskin, Eric, 1978. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 130, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
    4. Peter A. Diamond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Search and Breach of Contract, I: Steady States," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 282-316, Spring.
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