Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan
In: The Dynamics of Intervention: Regulation and Redistribution in the Mixed Economy
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DOI: 10.1016/S1529-2134(05)08010-5
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- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2005. "Ulysses and the Rent-Seekers: The Benefits and Challenges of Constitutional Constraints on Leviathan," Ratio Working Papers 68, The Ratio Institute.
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Cited by:
- Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2012. "Modeling constitutional choice: reflections on The Calculus of Consent 50 years on," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(3), pages 407-413, September.
- Pál Czeglédi, 2014. "The theory of interventionism as an Austrian theory of slowdowns," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 27(4), pages 419-449, December.
- Justesen, Mogens K. & Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter, 2007. "The constitution of economic growth: Testing the prosperity effects of a Madisonian model on a panel of countries 1980‐2000," MPRA Paper 36063, University Library of Munich, Germany.
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JEL classification:
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
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