Drew Fudenberg
Personal Details
First Name: | Drew |
Middle Name: | |
Last Name: | Fudenberg |
Suffix: | |
RePEc Short-ID: | pfu49 |
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public] | |
http://economics.mit.edu/faculty/drewf | |
6 Alcott Road | |
Terminal Degree: | 1981 Economics Department; Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) (from RePEc Genealogy) |
Affiliation
Economics Department
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
Cambridge, Massachusetts (United States)http://econ-www.mit.edu/
RePEc:edi:edmitus (more details at EDIRC)
Research output
Jump to: Working papers Articles Chapters BooksWorking papers
- Tuval Danenberg & Drew Fudenberg, 2024. "Endogenous Attention and the Spread of False News," Papers 2406.11024, arXiv.org.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2023. "Adjusting to Change in Complex Systems," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001821, David K. Levine.
- Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2023. "Adversarial forecasters, surprises and randomization," Levine's Working Paper Archive 11694000000000130, David K. Levine.
- Roberto Corrao & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2023. "On Concave Functions over Lotteries," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001804, David K. Levine.
- Isaiah Andrews & Drew Fudenberg & Lihua Lei & Annie Liang & Chaofeng Wu, 2022. "The Transfer Performance of Economic Models," Papers 2202.04796, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2024.
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022.
"Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models,"
Papers
2201.00776, arXiv.org.
- Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022. "Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2020. "Sins of Omission and Commission in Complex Systems," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001547, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Ying Gao & Harry Pei, 2020. "A Reputation for Honesty," Papers 2011.07159, arXiv.org.
- Drew Fudenberg & Wayne Gao & Annie Liang, 2020. "How Flexible is that Functional Form? Quantifying the Restrictiveness of Theories," Papers 2007.09213, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jon Kleinberg & Annie Liang & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2019. "Measuring the Completeness of Theories," Papers 1910.07022, arXiv.org.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2019. "Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001509, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Whitney K. Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2019.
"Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model,"
Papers
1908.05824, arXiv.org.
- Drew Fudenberg & Whitney Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2020. "Testing the drift-diffusion model," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(52), pages 33141-33148, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2017.
"Predicting and Understanding Initial Play,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
17-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 04 Jan 2018.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2019. "Predicting and Understanding Initial Play," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(12), pages 4112-4141, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2017. "Predicting and Understanding Initial Play," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Apr 2018.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017.
"Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games,"
Papers
1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
- Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020. "Payoff information and learning in signaling games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 96-120.
- Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew, 2017.
"Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship,"
CEPR Discussion Papers
12126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo, 2019. "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3780-3812, November.
- Juan I Block & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2017. "Learning Dynamics Based on Social Comparisons," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001375, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017.
"Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games,"
Papers
1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2018. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1215-1255, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017.
"Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium,"
Papers
1712.08954, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
- Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021. "Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He & Lorens Imhof, 2016. "Bayesian Posteriors For Arbitrarily Rare Events," Papers 1608.05002, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2017.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000001307, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2015.
"Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics,"
Scholarly Articles
27303657, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 771-800, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015.
"Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices,"
Working Paper
254346, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2018. "Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(12), pages 3651-3684, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2015.
"Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion,"
Scholarly Articles
14397609, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015. "Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 651-691, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated". "Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion," Working Paper 40033, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015.
"Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium,"
Scholarly Articles
27303656, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- , & ,, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Rand, David Gertler & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015.
"It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games,"
Scholarly Articles
27304431, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015. "It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 481-499.
- Dreber-Almenberg, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014.
"Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics,"
Scholarly Articles
11923167, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014. "Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 41-55.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Peysakhovich, Alexander, 2014.
"Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem,"
Scholarly Articles
27755296, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Peysakhovich, A, 2014. "Recency, Records and Recaps: Learning and Non-Equilibrium Behavior in a Simple Decision Problem," Working Paper 167691, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2014. "Recency, Consistent Learning, and Nash Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 13477947, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Anna Dreber & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & David G Rand, 2014. "Altruism and Self Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000962, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013. "Learning with Recency Bias," Levine's Bibliography 786969000000000846, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2013.
"Tail Probabilities for Triangular Arrays,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000685, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David Saul, 2013. "Tail probabilities for triangular arrays," Scholarly Articles 13041349, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Lavine, David K., 2012.
"Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems,"
Scholarly Articles
11022184, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2012. "Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 606-612.
- Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2012.
"Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World,"
Scholarly Articles
11223697, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 720-749, April.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
Post-Print
hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812781, HAL.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012.
"Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012.
"An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
786969000000000472, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2014. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 55-67.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2014. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Scholarly Articles 13051803, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Working Papers 2012-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, LA, 2012. "Phenotype Switching and Mutations in Random Environments," Scholarly Articles 11005332, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2011. "Fairness and Independence: An Impossibility Theorem," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000001, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,"
Scholarly Articles
8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Archetti, Marco & Green, Jerry R. & Pierce, Naomi Ellen & Yu, Douglas W. & Úbeda, Francisco, 2011. "Let the Right One In: A Microeconomic Approach to Partner Choice in Mutualisms," Scholarly Articles 9962009, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011.
"Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal,"
Scholarly Articles
27755311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games,"
Scholarly Articles
9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from private information in noisy repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- D. Fudenberg & C. Harris, 2010.
"Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
496, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992. "Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
415, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
- Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2010. "Re-examining coherent arbitrariness for the evaluation of common goods and simple lotteries," Working Papers 034, "Carlo F. Dondena" Centre for Research on Social Dynamics (DONDENA), Università Commerciale Luigi Bocconi.
- A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010.
"Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
425, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196300, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2010.
"On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
661465000000000312, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 131-145, May.
- Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2012. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," Scholarly Articles 11005333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2010.
"Timing and Self-Control,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
659843000000000008, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2012. "Timing and Self‐Control," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 1-42, January.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2012. "Timing and Self-Control," Scholarly Articles 11005331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010.
"Unobserved punishment supports cooperation,"
Scholarly Articles
27755297, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010. "Unobserved punishment supports cooperation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 78-86, February.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010.
"Word of Mouth Learning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
723, David K. Levine.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Word-of-mouth learning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius, 2010.
"Competing Auctions,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
506439000000000092, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 30-66, March.
- Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ellison, Glenn & Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043414, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010.
"Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
546, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2010.
"Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown,"
Scholarly Articles
13411374, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010. "Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1673-1710, September.
- E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010.
"Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
379, David K. Levine.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning, Experimentation and Equilibrium in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 218, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Games, I: Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 382, David K. Levine.
- G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg, 2010.
"Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
435, David K. Levine.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-643, August.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196332, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," IDEI Working Papers 17, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D., 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Working papers 92-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 2010. "Learning in Extensive Games, II: Experimentation and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 518, David K. Levine.
- Holden, Richard T. & Fudenberg, Drew & Aghion, Philippe, 2009.
"Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem,"
Scholarly Articles
3708929, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard T. Holden, 2009. "Subgame Perfect Implementation with Almost Perfect Information and the Hold-Up Problem," NBER Working Papers 15167, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2009.
"Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
843644000000000332, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2011. "Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 34-68, August.
- Rand, David Gertler & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Ellingson, Tore & Nowak, Martin A., 2009. "Positive Interactions Promote Public Cooperation," Scholarly Articles 3804483, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009.
"Learning and Equilibrium,"
Scholarly Articles
4382413, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 385-420, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi, 2008.
"Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
122247000000001695, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Scholarly Articles 27755310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin, 2008.
"Winners Don't Punish,"
Scholarly Articles
2252594, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008. "Winners don’t punish," Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2008. "A Long Run Collaboration on Long Run Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671757000000000010, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2008. "Learning-Theoretic Foundations for Equilibrium Analysis," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002317, David K. Levine.
- Imhof, Lorens & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008.
"Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations,"
Scholarly Articles
3196338, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2008. "Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 229-245, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "Erratum to 'Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information'," Levine's Working Paper Archive 671757000000000001, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2007.
"Random matching in adaptive dynamics,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000815, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2009. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 98-114, May.
- Imhof, Lorens & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics," Scholarly Articles 3190371, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Imhof, Lorens & Nowak, Martin & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Tit-for-Tat or Win-Stay, Lose-Shift?," Scholarly Articles 3200671, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007.
"Repeated Games with Frequent Signals,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
814577000000000009, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2007. "Non-Equilibrium Learning with Heterogeneous Priors," 2007 Meeting Papers 1031, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007.
"Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007.
"Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "A Large Deviation Theorem for Triangular Arrays," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000002, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2006.
"Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics","
Scholarly Articles
3208222, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2006.
"An Economists Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
784828000000000683, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "An Economist's Perspective on Multi-Agent Learning," Scholarly Articles 3200613, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Continuous Time Models of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," 2006 Meeting Papers 680, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006.
"Interim Correlated Rationalizability,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- , & , & ,, 2007. "Interim correlated rationalizability," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
- Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3196333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief Based Trading," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000975, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005.
"When is Reputation Bad,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Supplementary Appendix to: When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000992, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Interim Rationalizability,"
Levine's Bibliography
666156000000000526, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Interim Rationalizability," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2064, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005.
"A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000876, David K. Levine.
- David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1449-1476, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," Scholarly Articles 3196335, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2049, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2112, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005.
"Topologies on Types,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
- , & , & ,, 2006. "Topologies on types," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on Types," Scholarly Articles 3160489, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Robert M. Anderson & Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2005.
"Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2056, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2010. "Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 2-23, May.
- Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2010. "Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents," Scholarly Articles 27755298, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005.
"Superstition and Rational Learning,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000731, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2004.
"Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2033, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 550-567, March.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043420, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2010. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32111, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004.
"Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004.
"The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "Steady State Learning and the Code of Hammurabi," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2034, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine, 2004.
"Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations,"
Scholarly Articles
3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Martin A. Nowak & Akira Sasaki & Christine Taylor & Drew Fudenberg, 2004. "Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations," Nature, Nature, vol. 428(6983), pages 646-650, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2004.
"Imitation Processes with Small Mutations,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
2050, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006. "Imitation processes with small mutations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens, 2006. "Imitation Processes with Small Mutations," Scholarly Articles 3190369, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003.
"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
506439000000000098, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," Scholarly Articles 3160493, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002.
"Learning to Play Bayesian Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004. "Learning to play Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001.
"Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
7571, David K. Levine.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3200611, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999.
"Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
571, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
- Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
172, David K. Levine.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated". "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated". "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Pricing Under the Threat of Entry by a Sole Supplier of a Network Good," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1873, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1999.
"The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1870, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2000. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 253-272, Summer.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999.
"Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1871, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 634-657, Winter.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2222, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998. "Learning in games," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1998. "The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games with Discounting and Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 224, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998.
"Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1998. "Monopoly and Credibility in Asset Markets," Levine's Working Paper Archive 603, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
608, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1997.
"Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks,"
Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers
1803, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1998. "Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 235-258, Summer.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997.
"Conditional Universal Consistency,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
471, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Scholarly Articles 3204826, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1997.
"Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games,"
Scholarly Articles
3160492, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 507-536.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996.
"When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
180, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
- Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Scholarly Articles 3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996.
"Maintaining a Reputation against a Patient Opponent,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2015, David K. Levine.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2006. "Maintaining A Reputation Against A Patient Opponent," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000019, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"An Easier Way to Calibrate,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2059, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 131-137, October.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Scholarly Articles 3203773, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1996. "Balanced-Budget Mechanisms with Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 59, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Measuring Subject’s Losses in Experimental Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 370, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
624, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "The Theory of Learning in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996.
"Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
470, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995. "Consistency and cautious fictitious play," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Scholarly Articles 3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Tirole, Jean & Fudenberg, Drew, 1995.
"A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents,"
Scholarly Articles
3160494, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1995. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 75-93, February.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," IDEI Working Papers 34, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995.
"Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
103, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-778, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1994.
"Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
627, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K., 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 103-135, February.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 13, pages 275-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 591, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 1999. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 81, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Scholarly Articles 3203774, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2058, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993.
"Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
373, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
2147, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
607, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991.
"Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction,"
Scholarly Articles
3190370, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 218-219, February.
- Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Explaining Cooperatiob and Commitment in Repeated Games," Working papers 590, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Monopoly And Credibility In Asset Markets: An Example," Working papers 539, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Diamond, Peter, 1989.
"Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium,"
Scholarly Articles
3374509, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1989. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 606-619, June.
- Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "Equilibrium Payoffs Long-Run And Short-Run Players And Imperfect Public Information," Working papers 524, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988.
"On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
227, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Perfect Bayesian and Sequential Equilibria: A Clarifying Note," Working papers 496, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Open and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games With Many Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 221, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts,"
Working papers
494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1988. "Reputation, Unobserved Strategies, and Active Supermartingales," Working papers 490, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 1987.
"Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships,"
Working papers
468, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990. "Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1987.
"NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt7tr3c98t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990. "Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June.
- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987.
"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
229, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50.
- Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Scholarly Articles 3196301, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987.
"On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games,"
Working papers
467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991. "On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Reputation in the Simulation Play of Multiple Opponents," Working papers 466, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986.
"Limit Games and Limit Equilibria,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
220, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit games and limit equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 2, pages 21-39, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1983. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 289, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 1986.
"Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt9j39n20f, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327, Elsevier.
- Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole., 1986. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Economics Working Papers 8613, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Working papers 445, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1986.
"Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants,"
Department of Economics, Working Paper Series
qt2cs887vq, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg and David M. Kreps., 1986. "Reputation and Multiple Opponents I: Identical Entrants," Economics Working Papers 8602, University of California at Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Predation Without Reputation," Working papers 377, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Sequential Bargaining with Many Buyers," Working papers 366, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Infinite-Horizon Models of Bargaining with One-Sided Incomplete Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 1098, David K. Levine.
- E. Maskin & D. Fudenberg, 1984. "The Folk Theorem and Repeated Games with Discount and with Incomplete Information," Working papers 310, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Paul Ruud, 1984. "Strike Activity, Wage Settlements and Rationality," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2205, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983.
"Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games,"
Levine's Working Paper Archive
219, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 242, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1981. "Perfect Equilibria of Finite and Infinite Horizon Games," UCLA Economics Working Papers 216, UCLA Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps, 1969. "Reputation and Simultaneous Opponents," Levine's Working Paper Archive 604, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated".
"Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility,"
Working Paper
136731, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015. "Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 2371-2409, November.
repec:hal:pseose:hal-00812781 is not listed on IDEAS
Articles
- Corrao, Roberto & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2024. "On concave functions over lotteries," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(C).
- Drew Fudenberg & Gustav Karreskog Rehbinder, 2024. "Predicting Cooperation with Learning Models," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 1-32, February.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo, 2023. "Which misspecifications persist?," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(3), July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Lanzani, Giacomo & Strack, Philipp, 2023. "Pathwise concentration bounds for Bayesian beliefs," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 18(4), November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Indira Puri, 2022. "Simplicity and Probability Weighting in Choice under Risk," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 112, pages 421-425, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2022. "Intervention with limited information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 51(2), pages 379-389, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jon Kleinberg & Annie Liang & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2022. "Measuring the Completeness of Economic Models," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 130(4), pages 956-990.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2022. "Learning in Games and the Interpretation of Natural Experiments," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 353-377, August.
- Clark, Daniel & Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2022.
"Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 206(C).
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," PIER Working Paper Archive 22-003, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2022. "Observability, Dominance, and Induction in Learning Models," Papers 2201.00776, arXiv.org.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Gao, Ying & Pei, Harry, 2022. "A reputation for honesty," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 204(C).
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg, 2021. "Justified Communication Equilibrium," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 111(9), pages 3004-3034, September.
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky, 2021. "Record-Keeping and Cooperation in Large Societies [Has Punishment Played a Role in the Evolution of Cooperation? A Critical Review]," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 88(5), pages 2179-2209.
- Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2021.
"Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 194(C).
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Player-Compatible Learning and Player-Compatible Equilibrium," Papers 1712.08954, arXiv.org, revised May 2020.
- Drew Fudenberg & Giacomo Lanzani & Philipp Strack, 2021. "Limit Points of Endogenous Misspecified Learning," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 89(3), pages 1065-1098, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Georgiadis, George & Rayo, Luis, 2021. "Working to learn," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 197(C).
- Drew Fudenberg, 2020. "Report of the Search Committee for the Editor of the AEJ: Microeconomics," AEA Papers and Proceedings, American Economic Association, vol. 110, pages 763-763, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & He, Kevin, 2020.
"Payoff information and learning in signaling games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 120(C), pages 96-120.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Payoff Information and Learning in Signaling Games," Papers 1709.01024, arXiv.org, revised Jan 2020.
- Daniel Clark & Drew Fudenberg & Alexander Wolitzky, 2020. "Indirect reciprocity with simple records," Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(21), pages 11344-11349, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Whitney Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2020.
"Testing the drift-diffusion model,"
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, vol. 117(52), pages 33141-33148, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Whitney K. Newey & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2019. "Testing the Drift-Diffusion Model," Papers 1908.05824, arXiv.org.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2019.
"Predicting and Understanding Initial Play,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(12), pages 4112-4141, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2017. "Predicting and Understanding Initial Play," PIER Working Paper Archive 18-009, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 30 Apr 2018.
- Drew Fudenberg & Annie Liang, 2017. "Predicting and Understanding Initial Play," PIER Working Paper Archive 17-026, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 04 Jan 2018.
- Drew Fudenberg & Luis Rayo, 2019.
"Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(11), pages 3780-3812, November.
- Rayo, Luis & Fudenberg, Drew, 2017. "Training and Effort Dynamics in Apprenticeship," CEPR Discussion Papers 12126, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Block, Juan I. & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2019. "Learning dynamics with social comparisons and limited memory," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 14(1), January.
- Drew Fudenberg & Emanuel Vespa, 2019. "Learning Theory and Heterogeneous Play in a Signaling-Game Experiment," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 186-215, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2018.
"Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 86(4), pages 1215-1255, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & Kevin He, 2017. "Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games," Papers 1702.01819, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2018.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2018. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 364-381.
- Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2018.
"Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 108(12), pages 3651-3684, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Philipp Strack & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015. "Speed, Accuracy, and the Optimal Timing of Choices," Working Paper 254346, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Romanyuk, Gleb & Strack, Philipp, 2017. "Active learning with a misspecified prior," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 2017. "Whither game theory? Towards a theory oflearning in games," Voprosy Ekonomiki, NP Voprosy Ekonomiki, issue 5.
- Arechar, Antonio A. & Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2017. "“I'm just a soul whose intentions are good”: The role of communication in noisy repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 726-743.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2016. "Fast convergence in evolutionary models: A Lyapunov approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 161(C), pages 1-36.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2016. "Whither Game Theory? Towards a Theory of Learning in Games," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 30(4), pages 151-170, Fall.
- Rand, David G. & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015.
"It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 116(C), pages 481-499.
- Rand, David Gertler & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2015. "It's the thought that counts: The role of intentions in noisy repeated games," Scholarly Articles 27304431, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2015.
"Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 117(3), pages 771-800, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2015. "Tirole's Industrial Regulation and Organization Legacy in Economics," Scholarly Articles 27303657, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015.
"Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 2371-2409, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Ryota Iijima & Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated". "Stochastic Choice and Revealed Perturbed Utility," Working Paper 136731, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- , & ,, 2015.
"Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kamada, Yuichiro, 2015. "Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 27303656, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki, 2015.
"Dynamic Logit With Choice Aversion,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83, pages 651-691, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & Tomasz Strzalecki, "undated". "Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion," Working Paper 40033, Harvard University OpenScholar.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Strzalecki, Tomasz, 2015. "Dynamic Logit with Choice Aversion," Scholarly Articles 14397609, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2014.
"An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk,"
Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 55-67.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Maniadis, Zacharias, 2014. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Scholarly Articles 13051803, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "An Approximate Dual-Self Model and Paradoxes of Choice under Risk," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000472, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012. "An approximate dual-self model and paradoxes of choice under risk," Working Papers 2012-034, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Dreber, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014.
"Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 41-55.
- Dreber-Almenberg, Anna & Fudenberg, Drew & Rand, David G., 2014. "Who cooperates in repeated games: The role of altruism, inequity aversion, and demographics," Scholarly Articles 11923167, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014.
"Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 487-514.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuhta Ishii & Scott Duke Kominers, 2012. "Delayed-Response Strategies in Repeated Games with Observation Lags," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000390, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ishii, Yuhta & Kominers, Scott Duke, 2014. "Delayed-response strategies in repeated games with observation lags," Scholarly Articles 11880354, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012.
"Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 127(4), pages 1843-1881.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Post-Print hal-00812781, HAL.
- Philippe Aghion & Drew Fudenberg & Richard Holden & Takashi Kunimoto & Olivier Tercieux, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) hal-00812781, HAL.
- Tercieux, Olivier & Aghion, Philippe & Fudenberg, Drew & Holden, Richard & Kunimoto, Takashi, 2012. "Subgame-Perfect Implementation Under Information Perturbations," Scholarly Articles 11224965, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2012.
"Fairness, risk preferences and independence: Impossibility theorems,"
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 606-612.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Lavine, David K., 2012. "Fairness, Risk Preferences and Independence: Impossibility Theorems," Scholarly Articles 11022184, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2012.
"Timing and Self‐Control,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 80(1), pages 1-42, January.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2012. "Timing and Self-Control," Scholarly Articles 11005331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2010. "Timing and Self-Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 659843000000000008, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2012.
"On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 131-145, May.
- Maniadis, Zacharias & Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2012. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," Scholarly Articles 11005333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Zacharias Maniadis, 2010. "On the Robustness of Anchoring Effects in WTP and WTA Experiments," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000312, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David G. Rand & Anna Dreber, 2012.
"Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 720-749, April.
- Rand, David G & Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna, 2012. "Slow to Anger and Fast to Forgive: Cooperation in an Uncertain World," Scholarly Articles 11223697, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"Learning from private information in noisy repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(5), pages 1733-1769, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "Learning from Private Information in Noisy Repeated Games," Scholarly Articles 9962008, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011.
"The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The Folk Theorem for Irreducible Stochastic Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 8896226, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011.
"Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 86-99, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Olszewski, Wojciech, 2011. "Repeated games with asynchronous monitoring of an imperfect signal," Scholarly Articles 27755311, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Takahashi, Satoru, 2011.
"Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 100-120, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Heterogeneous Beliefs and Local Information in Stochastic Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000001695, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Fudenberg, Drew, 2011. "Heterogeneous beliefs and local information in stochastic fictitious play," Scholarly Articles 27755310, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2011.
"Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 3(3), pages 34-68, August.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2009. "Risk, Delay, and Convex Self-Control Costs," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000332, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Yuichi Yamamoto, 2010.
"Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(5), pages 1673-1710, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2010. "Repeated Games Where the Payoffs and Monitoring Structure Are Unknown," Scholarly Articles 13411374, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2010.
"Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 2-23, May.
- Robert M. Anderson & Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2005. "Location Choice in Two-Sided Markets with Indivisible Agents," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2056, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Anderson, Robert M. & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2010. "Location choice in two-sided markets with indivisible agents," Scholarly Articles 27755298, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010.
"Unobserved punishment supports cooperation,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 78-86, February.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Pathak, Parag A., 2010. "Unobserved punishment supports cooperation," Scholarly Articles 27755297, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2009.
"Random matching in adaptive dynamics,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 98-114, May.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2007. "Random matching in adaptive dynamics," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000815, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Imhof, Lorens & Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Random Matching in Adaptive Dynamics," Scholarly Articles 3190371, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009.
"Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(6), pages 2354-2371, November.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2009. "Self-confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Scholarly Articles 4686412, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Self Confirming Equilibrium and the Lucas Critique," Levine's Working Paper Archive 843644000000000022, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009.
"Learning and Equilibrium,"
Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 1(1), pages 385-420, May.
- Levine, David K. & Fudenberg, Drew, 2009. "Learning and Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 4382413, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2009.
"Repeated Games with Frequent Signals,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 124(1), pages 233-265.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000009, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2009. "Repeated Games with Frequent Signals," Scholarly Articles 3160491, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2008.
"Monotone imitation dynamics in large populations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 140(1), pages 229-245, May.
- Imhof, Lorens & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "Monotone Imitation Dynamics in Large Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196338, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Corrigendum to "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring"," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 11(1), pages 237-237, January.
- Anna Dreber & David G. Rand & Drew Fudenberg & Martin A. Nowak, 2008.
"Winners don’t punish,"
Nature, Nature, vol. 452(7185), pages 348-351, March.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Nowak, Martin, 2008. "Winners Don't Punish," Scholarly Articles 2252594, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008.
"When is reputation bad?,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "When is reputation bad?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- , & , & ,, 2007.
"Interim correlated rationalizability,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 2(1), pages 15-40, March.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2006. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001188, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Morris, Stephen & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Interim Correlated Rationalizability," Scholarly Articles 3196333, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007.
"The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007.
"Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring,"
Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007.
"Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007.
"Existence of equilibrium in large double auctions,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 550-567, March.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2007. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043420, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus & Szeidl, Adam, 2010. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32111, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Markus M. Mobius & Adam Szeidl, 2004. "Existence of Equilibrium in Large Double Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2033, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg, 2006.
"Advancing Beyond Advances in Behavioral Economics,"
Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 44(3), pages 694-711, September.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Advancing Beyond "Advances in Behavioral Economics"," Scholarly Articles 3208222, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- David K. Levine & Drew Fudenberg, 2006.
"A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(5), pages 1449-1476, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2006. "A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control," Scholarly Articles 3196335, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2049, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2112, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "A Dual Self Model of Impulse Control," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000876, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006.
"Superstition and Rational Learning,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 630-651, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000731, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2114, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2006. "Superstition and Rational Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196330, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens A., 2006.
"Imitation processes with small mutations,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 251-262, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Lorens A. Imhof, 2004. "Imitation Processes with Small Mutations," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2050, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Imhof, Lorens, 2006. "Imitation Processes with Small Mutations," Scholarly Articles 3190369, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- , & , & ,, 2006.
"Topologies on types,"
Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 1(3), pages 275-309, September.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Morris, Stephen, 2006. "Topologies on Types," Scholarly Articles 3160489, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000061, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & Stephen Morris, 2005. "Topologies on Types," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2093, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg, 2006. "Topologies on Type," Discussion Papers 1417, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "Learning and Belief-Based Trade," Latin American Journal of Economics-formerly Cuadernos de Economía, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 42(126), pages 199-208.
- Banerjee, Abhijit & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004.
"Word-of-mouth learning,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 1-22, January.
- Abhijit Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word of Mouth Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 723, David K. Levine.
- Martin A. Nowak & Akira Sasaki & Christine Taylor & Drew Fudenberg, 2004.
"Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations,"
Nature, Nature, vol. 428(6983), pages 646-650, April.
- Nowak, Martin & Sasaki, Akira & Fudenberg, Drew & Taylor, Christine, 2004. "Emergence of Cooperation and Evolutionary Stability in Finite Populations," Scholarly Articles 3196331, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2004.
"Learning to play Bayesian games,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 46(2), pages 282-303, February.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2001. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1926, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2002. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 625018000000000151, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2000. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Discussion Papers 1322, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, revised Jul 2001.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2004. "Learning to Play Bayesian Games," Scholarly Articles 3200612, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Möbius, 2004.
"Competing Auctions,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 2(1), pages 30-66, March.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg & Markus Mobius, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000092, David K. Levine.
- Glenn Allison & Drew Fudenberg, 2002. "Competing Auctions," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1960, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Ellison, Glenn & Mobius, Markus & Fudenberg, Drew, 2004. "Competing Auctions," Scholarly Articles 3043414, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew & Mobius, Markus, 2010. "Competing Auctions," Staff General Research Papers Archive 32106, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003.
"Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1249-1278.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife Edge of Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," NBER Working Papers 9528, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When do Market Models Tip?," Levine's Working Paper Archive 506439000000000098, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 2003. "Knife-Edge or Plateau: When Do Market Models Tip?," Scholarly Articles 3160493, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2002.
"Subjective Uncertainty over Behavior Strategies: A Correction,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 104(2), pages 473-478, June.
- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 2002. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3200611, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2001. "Subjective Uncertainty Over Behavior Strategies: A Correction," Levine's Working Paper Archive 7571, David K. Levine.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 2000.
"Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 90(1), pages 84-115, January.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1998. "Learning Purified Mixed Equilibria," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1817, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 2000.
"Customer Poaching and Brand Switching,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(4), pages 634-657, Winter.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1999. "Customer Poaching and Brand Switching," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1871, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 2000.
"The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 31(2), pages 253-272, Summer.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1999. "The Neo-Luddite's Lament: Excessive Upgrades in the Software Industry," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1870, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 2000. "Pricing a Network Good To Deter Entry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(4), pages 373-390, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"An Easier Way to Calibrate,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 131-137, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2059, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999. "An Easier Way to Calibrate," Scholarly Articles 3203773, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 89(2), pages 165-185, December.
- Levine, David & Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3200614, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Dekel, E. & Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1999. "Payoff information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Papers 9-99, Tel Aviv.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated". "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 040, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, "undated". "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," ELSE working papers 032, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1999. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 172, David K. Levine.
- Eddie Dekel & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Payoff Information and Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1774, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1999.
"Conditional Universal Consistency,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 29(1-2), pages 104-130, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Levine's Working Paper Archive 471, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1999. "Conditional Universal Consistency," Scholarly Articles 3204826, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998.
"When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Scholarly Articles 3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1998.
"Learning in games,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 631-639, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998. "Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2222, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1998.
"Upgrades, Tradeins, and Buybacks,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(2), pages 235-258, Summer.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Upgrades, Trade-Ins and BuyBacks," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1803, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & Dorothy Hodges, 1997. "Manual for Econometrica Authors, Revised," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 965-976, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1997.
"Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 112(2), pages 507-536.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1997. "Measuring Players' Losses in Experimental Games," Scholarly Articles 3160492, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1995.
"A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(1), pages 75-93, February.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1994. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," IDEI Working Papers 34, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Tirole, Jean & Fudenberg, Drew, 1995. "A Theory of Income and Dividend Smoothing Based on Incumbency Rents," Scholarly Articles 3160494, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M., 1995. "Learning in extensive-form games I. Self-confirming equilibria," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 20-55.
- Glenn Ellison & Drew Fudenberg, 1995.
"Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(1), pages 93-125.
- A. Banerjee & Drew Fudenberg, 2010. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 425, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Ellison, Glenn, 1995. "Word-of-Mouth Communication and Social Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196300, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1995.
"Consistency and cautious fictitious play,"
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 19(5-7), pages 1065-1089.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1995. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Scholarly Articles 3198694, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "Consistency and Cautious Fictitious Play," Levine's Working Paper Archive 470, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994.
"The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K., 1994.
"Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 103-135, February.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 13, pages 275-307, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 591, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 1999. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 81, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Scholarly Articles 3203774, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 627, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993.
"Self-Confirming Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 523-545, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2147, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Self-Confirming Equilibrium ," Working papers 581, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg Drew & Kreps David M., 1993.
"Learning Mixed Equilibria,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 5(3), pages 320-367, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps, 2010. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 415, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Kreps, D.M., 1992. "Learning Mixed Equilibria," Working papers 92-13, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993.
"Rules of Thumb for Social Learning,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(4), pages 612-643, August.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1993. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Scholarly Articles 3196332, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- G. Ellison & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Levine's Working Paper Archive 435, David K. Levine.
- Ellison, Glenn & Fudenberg, Drew, 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," IDEI Working Papers 17, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- Allison, G. & Fudenberg, D., 1992. "Rules of Thumb for Social Learning," Working papers 92-12, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1993.
"Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(3), pages 547-573, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1993. "Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 373, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Harris, C., 1992.
"Evolutionary dynamics with aggregate shocks,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 420-441, August.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Harris, Christopher, 1992. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," IDEI Working Papers 13, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
- D. Fudenberg & C. Harris, 2010. "Evolutionary Dynamics with Aggregate Shocks," Levine's Working Paper Archive 496, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992.
"Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991.
"An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1991. "Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 236-260, April.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991.
"Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(1), pages 218-219, February.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1991. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium: A Correction," Scholarly Articles 3190370, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1991.
"On the dispensability of public randomization in discounted repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 428-438, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1987. "On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeated Games," Working papers 467, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & Eric S. Maskin, 1990.
"Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players,"
The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(4), pages 555-573.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Repeated Games with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 474, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Maskin, Eric & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Scholarly Articles 3226950, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. M. Kreps & E. Maskin, 1998. "Repeated Games with Long-run and Short-run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 608, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1990.
"Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1279-1319, November.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1988. "Moral Hazard and Renegotiation in Agency Contracts," Working papers 494, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Dekel, Eddie & Fudenberg, Drew, 1990.
"Rational behavior with payoff uncertainty,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 243-267, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eddie Dekel, 1987. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Working papers 471, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- E. Dekel & D. Fudenberg, 2010. "Rational Behavior with Payoff Uncertainty," Levine's Working Paper Archive 379, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1990.
"Short-term contracts and long-term agency relationships,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 1-31, June.
- Drew Fudenberg & Bengt Holmstrom & Paul Milgrom, 1987. "Short-Term Contracts and Long-Term Agency Relationships," Working papers 468, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1990.
"Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(2), pages 274-279, May.
- D. Fudenberg & E. Maskin, 2010. "Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 546, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1990.
"Nash and perfect equilibria of discounted repeated games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 194-206, June.
- D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin., 1987. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Economics Working Papers 8736, University of California at Berkeley.
- Fudenberg, D. & Maskin, E., 1987. "NASH and the Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Games," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt7tr3c98t, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 1988. "Nash and Perfect Equilibria of Discounted Repeated Gains," Working papers 499, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989.
"Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-778, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
- Diamond, Peter & Fudenberg, Drew, 1989.
"Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium,"
Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(3), pages 606-619, June.
- Peter Diamond & Drew Fudenberg, 1987. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Working papers 465, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Diamond, Peter, 1989. "Rational Expectations Business Cycles in Search Equilibrium," Scholarly Articles 3374509, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1988.
"Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 3, pages 41-58, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988.
"On the robustness of equilibrium refinements,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps, 1987. "Reputation in the Simultaneous Play of Multiple Opponents," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 54(4), pages 541-568.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987.
"Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 102(1), pages 37-50.
- Tirole, Jean & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Scholarly Articles 3196301, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Incomplete Information Bargaining with Outside Opportunities," Levine's Working Paper Archive 229, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1987. "Understanding Rent Dissipation: On the Use of Game Theory in Industrial Organization," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 77(2), pages 176-183, May.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986.
"The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986.
"Limit games and limit equilibria,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 2, pages 21-39, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 220, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1983. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 289, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1986. "A "Signal-Jamming" Theory of Predation," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 17(3), pages 366-376, Autumn.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "A Theory of Exit in Duopoly," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 943-960, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Preemption and Rent Equalization in the Adoption of New Technology," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 52(3), pages 383-401.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1984. "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 74(2), pages 361-366, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Learning-by-Doing and Market Performance," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 14(2), pages 522-530, Autumn.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1983. "Capital as a commitment: Strategic investment to deter mobility," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 227-250, December.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983.
"Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008. "Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1983. "Sequential Bargaining with Incomplete Information," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 50(2), pages 221-247.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Gilbert, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph & Tirole, Jean, 1983.
"Preemption, leapfrogging and competition in patent races,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 3-31, June.
RePEc:nos:voprec:2017-05-6 is not listed on IDEAS
Chapters
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Eric Maskin, 2008.
"The Folk Theorem With Imperfect Public Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 12, pages 231-273,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David I & Maskin, Eric, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(5), pages 997-1039, September.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 2058, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K. & Maskin, E., 1989. "The Folk Theorem With Inperfect Public Information," Working papers 523, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 2008.
"On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 5, pages 67-93,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Kreps, David M. & Levine, David K., 1988. "On the robustness of equilibrium refinements," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 354-380, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Kreps & David K. Levine, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Levine's Working Paper Archive 227, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David M. Kreps & David K. Levine, 1986. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," UCLA Economics Working Papers 398, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Levine, David & Kreps, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1988. "On the Robustness of Equilibrium Refinements," Scholarly Articles 3350444, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Marco Celentani & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008.
"Maintaining A Reputation Against A Long-Lived Opponent,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 9, pages 163-176,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Celentani, Marco, et al, 1996. "Maintaining a Reputation against a Long-Lived Opponent," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(3), pages 691-704, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008.
"Limit Games and Limit Equilibria,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 2, pages 21-39,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit games and limit equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 38(2), pages 261-279, April.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Scholarly Articles 3350443, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1986. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 220, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1983. "Limit Games and Limit Equilibria," UCLA Economics Working Papers 289, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 15, pages 331-343,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2007. "The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 132(1), pages 461-473, January.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2004. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000030, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1961, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 2007. "The Nash-Threats Folk Theorem with Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games," Scholarly Articles 3203772, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Reputation And Equilibrium Selection In Games With A Patient Player,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 7, pages 123-142,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(4), pages 759-778, July.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 1987. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games With a Patient Player," Working papers 461, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1995. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 103, David K. Levine.
- D. Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1989. "Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player," Levine's Working Paper Archive 508, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2008.
"Subgame–Perfect Equilibria of Finite– and Infinite–Horizon Games,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 1, pages 3-20,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David, 1983. "Subgame-perfect equilibria of finite- and infinite-horizon games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 31(2), pages 251-268, December.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1983. "Subgame-Perfect Equilibria of Finite- and Infinite-Horizon Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 219, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"When is reputation bad?,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 10, pages 177-205,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 2008. "When is reputation bad?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 498-526, July.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2005. "When is Reputation Bad," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000016, David K. Levine.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1962, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Jeffrey Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2004. "When is Reputation Bad?," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2035, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Levine, David & Ely, Jeffrey & Fudenberg, Drew, 2008. "When is Reputation Bad?," Scholarly Articles 3196337, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Jeffery Ely & Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2002. "When is Reputation Bad?," Discussion Papers 1358, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 13, pages 275-307,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg Drew & Levine David K., 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 103-135, February.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1991. "Efficiency and Obsevability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Working papers 591, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 1999. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 81, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Scholarly Articles 3203774, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1994. "Efficiency and Observability with Long-Run and Short-Run Players," Levine's Working Paper Archive 627, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008. "Finite Player Approximations To A Continuum Of Players," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 4, pages 59-66, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2008.
"Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 16, pages 345-367,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K. & Takahashi, Satoru, 2007. "Perfect public equilibrium when players are patient," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 27-49, October.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 2051, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine & Satoru Takahashi, 2004. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players are Patient," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000865, David K. Levine.
- Takahashi, Satoru & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Perfect Public Equilibrium When Players Are Patient," Scholarly Articles 3196336, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 14, pages 309-330,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1991. "An approximate folk theorem with imperfect private information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 26-47, June.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1991. "An Approximate Folk Theorem with Imperfect Private Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 607, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, D. & Levine, D.K., 1989. "An Approximative Folk Theorem With Imperfect Private Information," Working papers 525, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008.
"The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-554, May.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 8, pages 143-161,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1992. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 561-579.
- Fudenberg, D., 1991. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Working papers 589, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- D. Fudenberg & D. K. Levine, 1999. "Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed," Levine's Working Paper Archive 571, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Continuous time limits of repeated games with imperfect public monitoring,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 17, pages 369-388,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 10(2), pages 173-192, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Levine's Working Paper Archive 699152000000000028, David K. Levine.
- Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 2007. "Continuous Time Limits of Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring," Scholarly Articles 3196334, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 2008.
"Open-Loop and Closed-Loop Equilibria in Dynamic Games with Many Players,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 3, pages 41-58,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David K., 1988. "Open-loop and closed-loop equilibria in dynamic games with many players," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-18, February.
- Drew Fudenberg & David Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 2008.
"When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?,"
World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 6, pages 95-120,
World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
- Fudenberg, Drew & Levine, David & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 79(1), pages 46-71, March.
- Drew Fudenberg, 1995. "When Are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible?," Discussion Papers 1114, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Pesendorfer, Wolfgang & Levine, David & Fudenberg, Drew, 1998. "When Are Nonanonymous Players Negligible?," Scholarly Articles 3203775, Harvard University Department of Economics.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Wolfgang Pesendorfer, 1996. "When are Non-Anonymous Players Negligible," Levine's Working Paper Archive 180, David K. Levine.
- Fudenberg, Drew & Tirole, Jean, 1989.
"Noncooperative game theory for industrial organization: An introduction and overview,"
Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, pages 259-327,
Elsevier.
- Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole., 1986. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Economics Working Papers 8613, University of California at Berkeley.
- Fudenberg, Drew, 1986. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt9j39n20f, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1987. "Noncooperative Game Theory for Industrial Organization: An Introduction and Overview," Working papers 445, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Books
- Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), 2008. "A Long-Run Collaboration on Long-Run Games," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., number 6880, August.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1998.
"The Theory of Learning in Games,"
MIT Press Books,
The MIT Press,
edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061945, April.
- Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, 1996. "The Theory of Learning in Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 624, David K. Levine.
- Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
More information
Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.Statistics
Access and download statistics for all items
Rankings
This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:- Average Rank Score
- Number of Works
- Number of Distinct Works
- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
- Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
- Number of Citations
- Number of Citations, Discounted by Citation Age
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor, Discounted by Citation Age
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors, Discounted by Citation Age
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
- Number of Citations, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors, Discounted by Citation Age
- h-index
- Number of Registered Citing Authors
- Number of Registered Citing Authors, Weighted by Rank (Max. 1 per Author)
- Number of Journal Pages
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Simple Impact Factor
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Recursive Impact Factor
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Simple Impact Factors
- Number of Journal Pages, Weighted by Number of Authors and Recursive Impact Factors
- Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
- Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months
- Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
- Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
- Euclidian citation score
- Closeness measure in co-authorship network
- Betweenness measure in co-authorship network
- Breadth of citations across fields
- Wu-Index
- Record of graduates
Co-authorship network on CollEc
Featured entries
This author is featured on the following reading lists, publication compilations, Wikipedia, or ReplicationWiki entries:- Drew Fudenberg in Wikipedia (German)
NEP Fields
NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 61 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.- NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (27) 2010-12-18 2012-03-14 2012-08-23 2012-09-30 2013-10-18 2013-12-20 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2014-11-07 2015-02-16 2015-04-19 2015-05-16 2016-03-23 2016-06-18 2016-06-18 2016-07-02 2016-07-16 2016-08-21 2017-02-12 2017-07-09 2017-09-10 2018-01-15 2020-08-24 2020-12-07 2022-02-07 2023-03-13 2024-07-29. Author is listed
- NEP-GTH: Game Theory (23) 2001-08-21 2002-07-04 2002-07-04 2005-03-06 2006-03-18 2006-08-05 2006-10-07 2007-02-10 2007-04-09 2007-12-19 2008-11-11 2009-07-28 2012-03-14 2014-07-28 2014-07-28 2016-03-23 2016-06-18 2016-06-18 2017-02-12 2017-09-10 2018-01-15 2018-11-26 2022-02-07. Author is listed
- NEP-HPE: History and Philosophy of Economics (12) 2010-11-20 2010-12-18 2010-12-18 2010-12-18 2014-07-28 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2016-03-23 2016-06-18 2016-06-18 2016-07-02 2018-01-15. Author is listed
- NEP-EXP: Experimental Economics (11) 2010-11-20 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2016-03-23 2016-06-18 2016-07-02 2016-07-16 2018-01-15 2018-11-26 2018-11-26 2022-02-07. Author is listed
- NEP-EVO: Evolutionary Economics (9) 2001-06-08 2001-09-26 2004-11-07 2008-08-14 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2014-11-07 2016-03-23 2019-10-21. Author is listed
- NEP-CBE: Cognitive and Behavioural Economics (7) 2006-10-14 2007-08-14 2013-12-20 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2014-11-07 2016-06-18. Author is listed
- NEP-BIG: Big Data (4) 2018-11-26 2018-11-26 2019-10-21 2022-02-28
- NEP-CTA: Contract Theory and Applications (4) 2009-07-28 2014-07-28 2015-05-16 2017-07-09
- NEP-UPT: Utility Models and Prospect Theory (4) 2007-08-14 2014-07-28 2014-11-07 2020-08-31
- NEP-CMP: Computational Economics (3) 2006-10-14 2018-11-26 2022-02-28
- NEP-MAC: Macroeconomics (3) 2004-01-12 2010-12-18 2012-09-30
- NEP-SOC: Social Norms and Social Capital (3) 2014-07-28 2014-08-28 2016-07-16
- NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2007-08-14 2012-09-30
- NEP-CBA: Central Banking (2) 2010-12-18 2010-12-18
- NEP-DCM: Discrete Choice Models (2) 2013-10-18 2015-04-19
- NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management and Knowledge Economy (2) 2006-10-14 2007-04-09
- NEP-NEU: Neuroeconomics (2) 2010-09-18 2014-08-28
- NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (1) 2016-07-02
- NEP-CWA: Central and Western Asia (1) 2022-02-28
- NEP-ECM: Econometrics (1) 2022-02-28
- NEP-GEO: Economic Geography (1) 2003-03-03
- NEP-GER: German Papers (1) 2016-07-16
- NEP-HIS: Business, Economic and Financial History (1) 2016-07-02
- NEP-HME: Heterodox Microeconomics (1) 2023-03-27
- NEP-HRM: Human Capital and Human Resource Management (1) 2017-07-09
- NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (1) 2003-11-23
- NEP-LTV: Unemployment, Inequality and Poverty (1) 2016-07-16
- NEP-PAY: Payment Systems and Financial Technology (1) 2024-07-29
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.
To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Drew Fudenberg should log into the RePEc Author Service.
To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.
To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.
Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.