Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/b/elg/eebook/1921.html
My bibliography
Save this book
Institutions, Contracts and Organizations
Editor
Listed:
- Claude Ménard
Abstract
This outstanding book presents new original contributions from some of the world’s leading economists including Ronald Coase, Douglass C. North, Masahiko Aoki, Oliver E. Williamson and Harold Demsetz. It demonstrates the extent and depth of the New Institutional Economics research programme which is having a worldwide impact on the economics profession.
Individual chapters are listed in the "Chapters" tab
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
Book Chapters
The following chapters of this book are listed in IDEAS- Ronald H. Coase, 2000. "The new institutional economics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Douglass C. North, 2000. "Understanding institutions," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Masahiko Aoki, 2000. "Institutional evolution as punctuated equilibria," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 3, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Douglass C. North, 2000. "A revolution in economics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lars Werin, 2000. "Ronald Coase and the new microeconomics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 5, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Oliver E. Williamson, 2000. "Ronald Harry Coase: international economist/institutional builder," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Claude Ménard, 2000. "Ronald H. Coase and the emergence of a new approach to economics," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 7, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Ronald H. Coase, 2000. "Publications," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 8, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Harold Demsetz, 2000. "Dogs and tails in the economic development story," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 9, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Philip Keefer & Mary M. Shirley, 2000. "Formal versus informal institutions in economic development," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Stanley L. Engerman & Stephen H. Haber & Kenneth L. Sokoloff, 2000. "Inequality, institution and differential paths of growth among New World economies," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 11, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Margaret Levi, 2000. "When good defenses make good neighbours: a transaction cost approach to trust, the absence of trust distrust," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 12, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jean Ensminger, 2000. "Experimental economics in the bush: why institutions matter," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 13, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Lee J. Alston & Kyle D. Kauffman, 2000. "The impact of paternalism on racial land rental differences in the USA," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 14, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Joshua Charap & Christian Harm, 2000. "Institutionalized corruption and the kleptocratic state," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 15, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Yoram Barzel, 2000. "The state and the diversity of third-party enforcers," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 16, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Claude Ménard, 2000. "Enforcement procedures and governance structures: what relationship?," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 17, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jose Alberto Garibaldi-Fernández, 2000. "The lens through which we see: the impact of ideas on institutional enforcement," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 18, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- John N. Drobak, 2000. "A cognitive science perspective on legal incentives," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 19, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Alberto Fernández & Benito Arru-ada & Manuel González, 2000. "Quasi-integration in less-than-truckload trucking," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 20, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Jean-Michel Glachant & Dominique Finon, 2000. "Why do the European Union's electricity industries continue to differ? A new institutional analysis," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 21, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Michael L. Cook & Constantine Iliopoulos, 2000. "Ill-defined property rights in collective action: the case of US agricultural cooperatives," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 22, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Didier Chabaud, 2000. "Asset specificity, work organization and mode of command: first insights from the automotive industry," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 23, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Alexandra Benham & Lee Benham, 2000. "Measuring the costs of exchange," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 24, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Stéphane Saussier, 2000. "When incomplete contract theory meets transaction cost economics: a test," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 25, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Eric Brousseau & M’hand Fares, 2000. "Incomplete contracts and governance structures: are incomplete contract theory and new institutional economics substitutes or complements?," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 26, Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Pieter H.M. Ruys & René van den Brink & Radislav Semenov, 2000. "Values and governance systems," Chapters, in: Claude Ménard (ed.), Institutions, Contracts and Organizations, chapter 27, Edward Elgar Publishing.
More about this item
Keywords
Economics and Finance;JEL classification:
- Z0 - Other Special Topics - - General
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:elg:eebook:1921. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Darrel McCalla (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.e-elgar.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.