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State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?

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  • Paul D. Carlsen
  • Jac C. Heckelman

Abstract

Voting at the 1787 Constitutional Convention followed the procedure of requiring state votes to be determined by the majority vote of each state's present delegates, and the outcome of the vote to be decided by majority vote of the states. In establishing the new legislature, the adopted Constitution set rules such that a simple majority of all present representatives would determine the outcome of each legislative vote. We investigate how Convention vote outcomes might have changed if this voting rule was in place for the Convention. Using spatial models on 398 separate roll calls, we identify which vote outcomes would have differed under individual delegate voting. Analysis suggests only 16 of the vote outcomes would have changed but those that were predicted to change included considering unequal representation in the Senate (i.e., similar to representation in the House) and requiring two‐thirds (rather than three‐fourths) of states to ratify constitutional amendments.

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  • Paul D. Carlsen & Jac C. Heckelman, 2016. "State bloc versus individual delegate voting at the constitutional convention: Did it make a difference?," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 82(3), pages 781-800, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:soecon:v:82:y:2016:i:3:p:781-800
    DOI: 10.1002/soej.12027
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L., 1984. "Economic Interests and the American Constitution: A Quantitative Rehabilitation of Charles A. Beard," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 509-519, June.
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    3. Heckelman, Jac C. & Dougherty, Keith L., 2007. "An Economic Interpretation of the Constitutional Convention of 1787 Revisited," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(4), pages 829-848, December.
    4. McGuire, Robert A. & Ohsfeldt, Robert L., 1986. "An Economic Model of Voting Behaviour over Specific Issues at the Constitutional Convention of 1787," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 46(1), pages 79-111, March.
    5. Charles A. Holt & Lisa R. Anderson, 1999. "Agendas and Strategic Voting," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 65(3), pages 622-629, January.
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    7. Heckelman, Jac C. & Dougherty, Keith L., 2013. "A Spatial Analysis of Delegate Voting at the Constitutional Convention," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 73(2), pages 407-444, June.
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