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Monetary Policy Communication: Perspectives from Former Policymakers at the ECB

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  • Michael Ehrmann
  • Sarah Holton
  • Danielle Kedan
  • Gillian Phelan

Abstract

A survey on monetary policy communication among former members of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) reveals that enhancing credibility and trust is viewed as the most important objective of communication. Respondents judge communication with financial markets and experts as adequate, but see room for improvement in communicating with the public. The central bank objective is seen as the most important topic. Several respondents perceived the ECB's inflation aim of “below, but close to, 2%” that was in place at the time as ambiguous and in need of clarification. Overall, there is broad consensus on various communication issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Ehrmann & Sarah Holton & Danielle Kedan & Gillian Phelan, 2024. "Monetary Policy Communication: Perspectives from Former Policymakers at the ECB," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(4), pages 837-864, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:56:y:2024:i:4:p:837-864
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13054
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    2. Ambrocio, Gene & Ferrero, Andrea & Jokivuolle, Esa & Ristolainen, Kim, 2022. "What Should the Inflation Target Be? Views from 600 Economists," CEPR Discussion Papers 17289, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Donato Masciandaro & Oana Peia & Davide Romelli, 2024. "Central bank communication and social media: From silence to Twitter," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(2), pages 365-388, April.
    4. Ehrmann, Michael & Holton, Sarah & Kedan, Danielle & Phelan, Gillian, 2022. "Monetary policy communication – past ECB policymakers commend Bank’s progress and call for more," Research Bulletin, European Central Bank, vol. 93.
    5. Ehrmann, Michael & Georgarakos, Dimitris & Kenny, Geoff, 2023. "Credibility gains from communicating with the public: evidence from the ECB’s new monetary policy strategy," Working Paper Series 2785, European Central Bank.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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