Economies of Scale and Barriers to Entry
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DOI: 10.1086/261031
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- Schmalensee, Richard., 1980. "Economies of scale and barriers to entry," Working papers 1130-80., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
References listed on IDEAS
- A. Michael Spence, 1977. "Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(2), pages 534-544, Autumn.
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- Dixit, Avinash, 1978. "A Model Of Duopoly Suggesting A Theory Of Entry Barriers," Economic Research Papers 269023, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
- Dixit, Avinash K., 1978. "A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 125, University of Warwick, Department of Economics.
- Salop, Steven C, 1979. "Strategic Entry Deterrence," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(2), pages 335-338, May.
- B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, 1980. "Exit Barriers are Entry Barriers: The Durability of Capital as a Barrier to Entry," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 11(2), pages 721-729, Autumn.
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