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Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia

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  • William Miles

Abstract

Colombia undertook reform of its central bank in 1991, pushing it in the direction of greater independence. We find that this reform led to a significant decrease in the level of inflation, as well as inflation uncertainty, suggesting an increase in credibility. However, there has also been an increase in inflation persistence since reform. The lower mean but greater persistence of inflation indicates that central bank independence has shifted the Phillips curve inward but also flattened it, a result consistent with recent research for the Euro-zone and the United States. Finally, further analysis reveals that, in accordance with the Friedman-Ball hypothesis, higher inflation raises uncertainty in Colombia, but that uncertainty does not increase inflation.

Suggested Citation

  • William Miles, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 65-79.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:intecj:v:23:y:2009:i:1:p:65-79
    DOI: 10.1080/10168730802696624
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen G. Cecchetti & Guy Debelle, 2006. "Has the inflation process changed? [‘Did the underlying behaviour of inflation change in the 1980s? A study of 22 countries,’]," Economic Policy, CEPR, CESifo, Sciences Po;CES;MSH, vol. 21(46), pages 312-352.
    2. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Taniya Ghosh & Yadavindu Ajit, 2023. "Central bank transparency, the role of institutions and inflation persistence," Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai Working Papers 2023-012, Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India.
    2. Stéphane Goutte & David Guerreiro & Bilel Sanhaji & Sophie Saglio & Julien Chevallier, 2019. "International Financial Markets," Post-Print halshs-02183053, HAL.

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    Keywords

    Central bank independence; Colombia;

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