IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/defpea/v22y2011i4p367-392.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Hard Currencies For Hard Times. Terror Attacks And The Choice Of Monetary Anchors

Author

Listed:
  • Tal Sadeh

Abstract

As terror’s victims increase, hard currency commitments gain effectiveness in reducing inflation, and central bank independence loses its effectiveness, because terror reduces transparency and the number of veto players in domestic politics. PCSE (Panel‐Corrected Standard Error) estimations of inflation are run on pooled cross‐section time‐series sample of 87 countries from 1975--2005. When the trend level rises to 100 victims annually a currency board reduces inflation by up to 7.5%, and an independent bank raises inflation by up to 8%. When victims exceptionally exceed the trend by 100, a currency board reduces inflation by 2.5%, and an independent bank raises it by 2%.

Suggested Citation

  • Tal Sadeh, 2011. "Hard Currencies For Hard Times. Terror Attacks And The Choice Of Monetary Anchors," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(4), pages 367-392, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:367-392
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2010.500817
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/10242694.2010.500817
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/10242694.2010.500817?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Klor, Esteban & Berrebi, Claude, 2005. "The Impact of Terrorism Across Industries: An Empirical Study," CEPR Discussion Papers 5360, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    2. Léonce Ndikumana, 2001. "Fiscal Policy, Conflict, and Reconstruction in Burundi and Rwanda," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2001-62, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Cukierman Alex, 1992. "Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, And Independance: Theory And Evidence," Journal des Economistes et des Etudes Humaines, De Gruyter, vol. 3(4), pages 1-10, December.
    4. Mr. Jerald A Schiff & Mr. Tamim Bayoumi & Mr. Daniel P. Hewitt, 1993. "Economic Consequences of Lower Military Spending: Some Simulation Results," IMF Working Papers 1993/017, International Monetary Fund.
    5. Tony Addison & Abdur Chowdhury & Mansoob Murshed, 2002. "By How Much Does Conflict Reduce Financial Development?," WIDER Working Paper Series DP2002-48, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Afshari , zahra & Daraei , Fatemeh, 2018. "The Impact of Central Bank Independence on Stock Market Volatility," Journal of Money and Economy, Monetary and Banking Research Institute, Central Bank of the Islamic Republic of Iran, vol. 13(4), pages 423-441, October.
    2. Ana Carolina Garriga, 2016. "Central Bank Independence in the World: A New Data Set," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(5), pages 849-868, October.
    3. Tadadjeu Wemba, Dessy-Karl & Essiane, Patrick-Nelson Daniel, 2018. "Autonomie des Banques Centrales et Finances Publiques en Afrique subsaharienne [Autonomy of Central Banks and Public Finances in Sub-saharan Africa]," MPRA Paper 100828, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Gupta, Sanjeev & Clements, Benedict & Bhattacharya, Rina & Chakravarti, Shamit, 2004. "Fiscal consequences of armed conflict and terrorism in low- and middle-income countries," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 403-421, June.
    2. Mr. Benedict J. Clements & Mr. Sanjeev Gupta & Shamit Chakravarti & Ms. Rina Bhattacharya, 2002. "Fiscal Consequences of Armed Conflict and Terrorism in Low- and Middle-Income Countries," IMF Working Papers 2002/142, International Monetary Fund.
    3. José Pedro Pontes & Armando J. Garcia Pires, 2020. "(De) industrialization in the Von Thünen’s economy," Working Papers REM 2020/0141, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, REM, Universidade de Lisboa.
    4. Lohmann, Susanne, 1997. "Partisan control of the money supply and decentralized appointment powers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 225-246, May.
    5. William Miles, 2009. "Central Bank Independence, Inflation and Uncertainty: The Case of Colombia," International Economic Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(1), pages 65-79.
    6. Winkler, Bernhard, 2000. "Which kind of transparency? On the need for clarity in monetary policy-making," Working Paper Series 0026, European Central Bank.
    7. Herman Bennett & Norman Loayza, 2002. "Policy Biases when the Monetary and Fiscal Authorities Have Different Objectives," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Norman Loayza & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel & Norman Loayza (Series Editor) & Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel (Series (ed.),Monetary Policy: Rules and Transmission Mechanisms, edition 1, volume 4, chapter 11, pages 299-330, Central Bank of Chile.
    8. Francesca Castellani & Xavier Debrun, 2005. "Designing Macroeconomic Frameworks: A Positive Analysis of Monetary and Fiscal Delegation," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 8(1), pages 87-117, March.
    9. Alex Cukierman & Anton Muscatelli, 2001. "Do Central Banks have Precautionary Demands for Expansions and for Price Stability?," Working Papers 2002_4, Business School - Economics, University of Glasgow, revised Mar 2002.
    10. Carlo Cambini & Yossi Spiegel, 2016. "Investment and Capital Structure of Partially Private Regulated Firms," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 25(2), pages 487-515, April.
    11. Mazumder, Sandeep, 2014. "Determinants of the sacrifice ratio: Evidence from OECD and non-OECD countries," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 117-135.
    12. Ftiti, Zied & Aguir, Abdelkader & Smida, Mounir, 2017. "Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank independence–inflation relationship?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 67(C), pages 215-227.
    13. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Discussion Paper 1995-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    14. Martin, Fernando M., 2015. "Debt, inflation and central bank independence," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 79(C), pages 129-150.
    15. Montoya, Miguel A. & Trillas, Francesc, 2007. "The measurement of the independence of telecommunications regulatory agencies in Latin America and the Caribbean," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 182-190, September.
    16. Christoph S. Weber, 2018. "Central bank transparency and inflation (volatility) – new evidence," International Economics and Economic Policy, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 21-67, January.
    17. MARTÍNEZ-RUIZ, Elena & NOGUES-MARCO, Pilar, 2018. "The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Stability During the Gold Standard. Spain 1874—1914," Discussion paper series HIAS-E-75, Hitotsubashi Institute for Advanced Study, Hitotsubashi University.
    18. Levent, Korap, 2009. "Enflasyon ve enflasyon belirsizliği ilişkisi için G7 ekonomileri üzerine bir inceleme [An investigation for the inflation and inflation uncertainty relationship upon the G7 economies]," MPRA Paper 19478, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Broto Carmen & Ruiz Esther, 2009. "Testing for Conditional Heteroscedasticity in the Components of Inflation," Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics & Econometrics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-30, May.
    20. Lars P Feld & Volker Wieland, 2021. "The German Federal Constitutional Court Ruling and the European Central Bank’s Strategy," Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(2), pages 217-253.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:22:y:2011:i:4:p:367-392. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/GDPE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.