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Tax rules

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  • Hans Gersbach
  • Volker Hahn
  • Stephan Imhof

Abstract

Tax schemes are more restricted by constitutional rules than subsidies. We introduce a model of public good provision with incentive problems in agenda-setting and identify several advantages of restrictions on tax schemes. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal and adoption of inefficient projects that benefit only a small minority. We also propose “redistribution efficiency” as a socially desirable property of proposals and find that tax rules guarantee this kind of efficiency. Moreover, a constitution that requires certain restrictions on both taxes and subsidies satisfies a criterion we label “robustness against counter-proposals.” We provide an axiomatic characterization of this constitution. Finally, we perform utilitarian welfare comparisons. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach & Volker Hahn & Stephan Imhof, 2013. "Tax rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 41(1), pages 19-42, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:41:y:2013:i:1:p:19-42
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0675-1
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    Cited by:

    1. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2019. "Households, markets and public choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 16-28.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H40 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - General

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