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Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem

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  • Toyotaka Sakai, 2012. "Fair waste pricing: an axiomatic analysis to the NIMBY problem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 50(2), pages 499-521, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:50:y:2012:i:2:p:499-521
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-010-0562-x
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    22. Shinji Ohseto, 2000. "Strategy-proof and efficient allocation of an indivisible good on finitely restricted preference domains," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 29(3), pages 365-374.
    23. Toyotaka Sakai, 2008. "Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(2), pages 347-356, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ferraz, Eduardo & Mantilla, César, 2020. "Lindahl vs. Lindahl: Optimal siting and sizing of a noxious facility," Working papers 65, Red Investigadores de Economía.
    2. Stefan Ambec & Yann Kervinio, 2016. "Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 119-155, January.
    3. Ricardo Martínez & Bernardo Moreno, 2013. "Strategy-proofness on restricted separable domains," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 17(4), pages 323-333, December.
    4. Peters, Hans & Roy, Souvik & Sadhukhan, Soumyarup & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "An extreme point characterization of strategy-proof and unanimous probabilistic rules over binary restricted domains," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 69(C), pages 84-90.
    5. Duygu Yengin, 2013. "Identical Preferences Lower Bound for Allocation of Heterogenous Tasks and NIMBY Problems," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 15(4), pages 580-601, August.
    6. Lahiri, Abhinaba & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2017. "Strategy-proof location of public bads in a two-country model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 150-159.
    7. Satoshi Nakada, 2018. "Envy-free allocation of indivisible goods with money and externalities," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(1), pages 52-59.
    8. Ghidoni, Riccardo, 2017. "Mistrust and Opposition to Large-Scale Projects : An Experiment on the Role of Uncertainty," Discussion Paper 2017-053, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    9. Laurent-Lucchetti, Jérémy & Leroux, Justin, 2009. "Axiomatic foundation for Lindahl pricing in the NIMBY context," MPRA Paper 14930, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2014. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(1), pages 83-108, May.
    11. Oto-Peralías, Daniel & Cuberes, David, 2023. "Land Concentration and Mega Photovoltaic Plants," OSF Preprints hakt5, Center for Open Science.
    12. Abhinaba Lahiri & Ton Storcken, 2019. "Strategy-proof location of public bads in an interval," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 53(1), pages 49-62, June.
    13. Yamashita, Takuro, 2018. "Revenue guarantees in auctions with a (correlated) common prior and additional information," TSE Working Papers 18-937, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    14. Yuji Fujinaka & Toyotaka Sakai, 2009. "The positive consequence of strategic manipulation in indivisible good allocation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 38(3), pages 325-348, November.
    15. Ferraz, Eduardo & Mantilla, César, 2023. "A mechanism for the efficient provision of Potential Pareto public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 225(C).
    16. Kazuhiko Hashimoto & Yu Nakayama, 2016. "Strategy-Proofness on Bankruptcy Problems with an Indivisible Object," ISER Discussion Paper 0961, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    17. Kevin Techer, 2023. "Hazardous waste transportation: a cost allocation analysis," Working Papers hal-04099139, HAL.
    18. Yuichi Ishimura & Kenji Takeuchi, 2018. "Where Did Our NIMBY Go? The Spatial Concentration of Waste Landfill Sites in Japan," Discussion Papers 1818, Graduate School of Economics, Kobe University.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    NIMBY (Not in my backyard); Market design; Nearly robustness to strategic manipulation; Proportional rule; Manipulation game; Core; D63; D60; C71;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General
    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games

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