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Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect

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  • Simon Board

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  • Simon Board, 2009. "Revealing information in auctions: the allocation effect," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(1), pages 125-135, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:38:y:2009:i:1:p:125-135
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-006-0177-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1988. "On a Possible Benefit to Bid Takers from Using Multi-Stage Auctions," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 34(9), pages 1109-1120, September.
    2. Bulow, Jeremy & Klemperer, Paul, 1996. "Auctions versus Negotiations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 180-194, March.
    3. Bergemann, Dirk & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2007. "Information structures in optimal auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 580-609, November.
    4. Mark Armstrong, 2000. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 67(3), pages 455-481.
    5. Krishna, Vijay, 2009. "Auction Theory," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 2, number 9780123745071.
    6. Vagstad, Steinar, 2007. "Should auctioneers supply early information for prospective bidders?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(3), pages 597-614, June.
    7. Lewis, Tracy R & Sappington, David E M, 1994. "Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 35(2), pages 309-327, May.
    8. Motty Perry & Philip J. Reny, 1999. "On The Failure of the Linkage Principle in Multi-Unit Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 67(4), pages 895-900, July.
    9. Palfrey, Thomas R, 1983. "Bundling Decisions by a Multiproduct Monopolist with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(2), pages 463-483, March.
    10. Milgrom,Paul, 2004. "Putting Auction Theory to Work," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521536721, September.
    11. Indranil Chakraborty, 1999. "Bundling decisions for selling multiple objects," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(3), pages 723-733.
    12. Nicola Persico, 2000. "Information Acquisition in Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(1), pages 135-148, January.
    13. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
    14. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers 158, Barcelona School of Economics.
    15. Juan-José Ganuza, 2003. "Ignorance Promotes Competition: an Auction Model with Endogenous Private Valuations," Working Papers 107, Barcelona School of Economics.
    16. Juan-José Ganuza & José S. Penalva Zuasti, 2005. "On Information and Competition in Private Value Auctions," Working Papers wp2005_0503, CEMFI.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Information revelation; Bundling; D44; D82; L12;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies

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