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Blue blood or true blood: Why are levels of intrastate armed conflict so low in Middle Eastern monarchies?

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  • Fenja Søndergaard Møller

Abstract

In the aftermath of the Arab uprisings, the difference between monarchies and republics appears more profound than ever. Aside from Bahrain, all of the Middle Eastern monarchies avoided major anti-governmental protests, and no armed conflict has occurred in any of them since 1979. Inspired by Middle Eastern case studies, this article argues that traditional legitimacy contributes to peace in Middle Eastern monarchies. The article explores the argument with time-series cross-sectional data covering 19 Middle Eastern countries from 1947 (or independence) to 2009. Traditional legitimacy is not measured directly but assumed to be embedded in the monarchical regime type, and the results show that alternative covariates are unable to fully explain the monarchical peace. Moreover, the study finds that horizontal discrimination increases the risk of intrastate conflict in authoritarian republics but that discrimination has no effect in monarchies. Future conflict studies should therefore consider legitimacy connected to authoritarian regime types.

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  • Fenja Søndergaard Møller, 2019. "Blue blood or true blood: Why are levels of intrastate armed conflict so low in Middle Eastern monarchies?," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(5), pages 517-544, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:compsc:v:36:y:2019:i:5:p:517-544
    DOI: 10.1177/0738894217714716
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