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Credible Spatial Preemption through Franchising

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  • Gillian K. Hadfield

Abstract

The analysis of strategic behavior frequently revolves around the problem of identifying commitment "technologies" that credibly expand strategic opportunities. This article revisits the question of spatial preemption to investigate the potential for organizational form to serve as a commitment technology in the effort to deter entry. The analysis demonstrates first that delegation of pricing authority to independent outlet operators through a franchise contract can deter entry. Moreover, this delegation can be made credible in the sense of being renegotiation-proof through appropriate contractual design.

Suggested Citation

  • Gillian K. Hadfield, 1991. "Credible Spatial Preemption through Franchising," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 22(4), pages 531-543, Winter.
    • Handle: RePEc:rje:randje:v:22:y:1991:i:winter:p:531-543
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Meiseberg, Brinja & Perrigot, Rozenn, 2020. "Pricing-based practices, conflicts and performance in franchising," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 38(6), pages 939-955.
    2. Corts, Kenneth S. & Neher, Darwin V., 2003. "Credible delegation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(3), pages 395-407, June.
    3. Haimanti Bhattacharya & Robert Innes, 2016. "Concentration, Product Variety, and Entry-for-Merger: Evidence from New Product Introductions in the U.S. Food Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 98(5), pages 1360-1376.
    4. Francine Lafontaine & Kathryn L. Shaw, 1999. "The Dynamics of Franchise Contracting: Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(5), pages 1041-1080, October.
    5. Michael W. Walrath, 2016. "Entry Models Applied to Churches: Could Protestants use a Catholic Bishop to Solve Excess Entry?," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 557-588, September.
    6. Eugenio Jose Silva Bitti & Muriel Fadairo & Cintya Lanchimba & Vivian-Lara Silva, 2016. "Spatial strategies in Brazilian Franchising; Behavior categories and Performance Outcome," Working Papers 1614, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon.
    7. Suzuki, Ayako, 2009. "Market foreclosure and vertical merger: A case study of the vertical merger between Turner Broadcasting and Time Warner," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 532-543, July.
    8. Ishikawa, Toshiharu & Toda, Masao, 2005. "Retail market structure and the threat by the manufacturer to sell goods directly to the consumer," Socio-Economic Planning Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 43-55, March.
    9. Ishibashi, Ikuo, 2003. "A note on credible spatial entry deterrence," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(2), pages 283-289, February.
    10. Ashiya, Masahiro, 2000. "Weak entrants are welcome," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(6), pages 975-984, August.
    11. Murooka, Takeshi, 2013. "A note on credible spatial preemption in an entry–exit game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(1), pages 26-28.
    12. Kenneth S. Corts, 2001. "The Strategic Effects of Vertical Market Structure: Common Agency and Divisionalization in the US Motion Picture Industry," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(4), pages 509-528, December.
    13. Kato, Atsushi, 2004. "Patent pool enhances market competition," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 255-268, June.
    14. Spinelli, Steve & Birley, Sue, 1996. "Toward a theory of conflict in the franchise system," Journal of Business Venturing, Elsevier, vol. 11(5), pages 329-342, September.
    15. Francine Lafontaine, 1995. "Pricing Decisions in Franchised Chains: A Look at the Restaurant and Fast-Food Industry," NBER Working Papers 5247, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Yunchuan Liu & Sunil Gupta & Z. John Zhang, 2006. "Note on Self-Restraint as an Online Entry-Deterrence Strategy," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 52(11), pages 1799-1809, November.
    17. Arturs Kalnins, 2017. "Pricing Variation Within Dual-Distribution Chains: The Different Implications of Externalities and Signaling for High- and Low-Quality Brands," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 63(1), pages 139-152, January.
    18. Arora, Ashish & Fosfuri, Andrea, 2003. "Licensing the market for technology," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 277-295, October.
    19. Nathan E. Wilson, 2015. "Local Market Structure and Strategic Organizational Form Choices: Evidence from Gasoline Stations," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(1), pages 119-140, February.
    20. Innes, Robert, 2008. "Entry for merger with flexible manufacturing: Implications for competition policy," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 266-287, January.
    21. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Price commitment and the strategic launch of a fighter brand," Quantitative Marketing and Economics (QME), Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 381-435, September.

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