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The pros and cons of rent-seeking: Political rent in various research paradigms

Author

Listed:
  • Sękowski, Stefan

    (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Faculty of Economics)

Abstract

This article shows that how we look at political rent and rent-seeking depends on our position on state interference in the economy and which theory of regulation we are familiar with. Although the theory of rent-seeking is in accordance with the paradigm of the private interest (economic) theories of regulation, the researcher also needs an insight based on the public interest theories of regulation if he wants to judge the impact of rent-seeking and the creation of political rent on social well-being properly. The paper is also a conceptualization of political rent. It describes forms of rent-seeking and economic systems most amenable to it.

Suggested Citation

  • Sękowski, Stefan, 2021. "The pros and cons of rent-seeking: Political rent in various research paradigms," Studia z Polityki Publicznej / Public Policy Studies, Warsaw School of Economics, vol. 8(2), pages 1-17, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:ris:spppps:0016
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    rent-seeking; rent; predatory state; state capitalism; state capture; regulation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • H82 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - Governmental Property
    • P51 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems

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