Organizational dynamics: culture, design, and performance
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- Besley, Tim & Persson, Torsten, 2022. "Organizational Dynamics: Culture, Design, and Performance," CEPR Discussion Papers 17382, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Besley, Timothy & Persson, Torsten, 2024. "Organizational dynamics: culture, design, and performance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 116651, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
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Cited by:
- Tukiainen, Janne & Blesse, Sebastian & Bohne, Albrecht & Giuffrida, Leonardo M. & Jääskeläinen, Jan & Luukinen, Ari & Sieppi, Antti, 2021.
"What are the priorities of bureaucrats? Evidence from conjoint experiments with procurement officials,"
ZEW Discussion Papers
21-033, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research.
- Janne Tukiainen & Sebastian Blesse & Albrecht Bohne & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Jan Jääskeläinen & Ari Luukinen & Antti Sieppi, 2023. "What Are the Priorities of Bureaucrats? Evidence from Conjoint Experiments with Procurement Officials," CESifo Working Paper Series 10199, CESifo.
- Janne Tukiainen & Sebastian Blesse & Albrecht Bohne & Leonardo M. Giuffrida & Jan Jäässkeläinen & Ari Luukinen & Antti Sieppi, 2021. "What Are the Priorities of Bureaucrats? Evidence from Conjoint Experiments with Procurement Officials," EconPol Working Paper 63, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
- M14 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Business Administration - - - Corporate Culture; Diversity; Social Responsibility
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