Forensic Economics In Competition Law Enforcement
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Cited by:
- Valentiny, Pál, 2019. "Közgazdaságtan a jogalkalmazásban [Forensic economics]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 134-162.
- Yannis Katsoulacos, 2019. "On the choice of legal standards: a positive theory for comparative analysis," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(2), pages 125-165, October.
- Haucap, Justus & Heimeshoff, Ulrich & Schultz, Luis Manuel, 2010. "Legal and illegal cartels in Germany between 1958 and 2004," DICE Discussion Papers 08, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
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