The Role of Cooperation and Reciprocity in Structuring Carbon Sequestration Contracts in Developing Countries
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Cited by:
- Salas, Paula Cordero & Roe, Brian E. & Sohngen, Brent, 2012.
"Addressing Additionality in REDD Contracts when Formal Enforcement is Absent,"
2012 Annual Meeting, August 12-14, 2012, Seattle, Washington
124505, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Cordero Salas, Paula & Roe, Brian & Sohngen, Brent, 2013. "Addressing additionality in REDD contracts when formal enforcement is absent," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6502, The World Bank.
- Robert Dur & Jan Tichem, 2015.
"Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace,"
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(3), pages 485-500, September.
- Dur, Robert & Tichem, Jan, 2013. "Altruism and Relational Incentives in the Workplace," IZA Discussion Papers 7363, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Jan Tichem, 2013. "Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 13-196/VII, Tinbergen Institute.
- Gren, Ing-Marie & Zeleke, Abenezer Aklilu, 2016. "Policy design for forest carbon sequestration: A review of the literature," Forest Policy and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 128-136.
- Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2018. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts with early-exit options: The case of conservation contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 267(1), pages 368-380.
- Chiroleu-Assouline, Mireille & Poudou, Jean-Christophe & Roussel, Sébastien, 2018.
"Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues,"
Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 1-17.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2018. "Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues," PSE-Ecole d'économie de Paris (Postprint) halshs-01643656, HAL.
- Mireille Chiroleu-Assouline & Jean-Christophe Poudou & Sébastien Roussel, 2018. "Designing REDD+ contracts to resolve additionality issues," Post-Print halshs-01643656, HAL.
- Alix-Garcia, Jennifer & Wolff, Hendrik, 2014. "Payment for Ecosystem Services from Forests," IZA Discussion Papers 8179, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
- Stefano Dughera & Alain Marciano, 2022. "Supervise me if you can. Relational feelings, incentive pays and supervisory violations," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 47-72, June.
- Di Corato, Luca & Dosi, Cesare & Moretto, Michele, 2015. "Multidimensional auctions for long-term procurement contracts under the threat of early exit: the case of conservation auctions," Working Paper Series 2015:6, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences, Department Economics.
- Paula Cordero Salas & Brian E. Roe & Brent Sohngen, 2018. "Additionality When REDD Contracts Must be Self-Enforcing," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 69(1), pages 195-215, January.
- Stefanie Engel & Charles Palmer & Luca Taschini & Simon Urech, 2015. "Conservation Payments under Uncertainty," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 91(1), pages 36-56.
- Robert Dur & Jan Tichem, 2012.
"Social Relations and Relational Incentives,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
12-054/1, Tinbergen Institute.
- Robert Dur & Jan Tichem, 2012. "Social Relations and Relational Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series 3826, CESifo.
- Cordero Salas, Paula, 2013. "Designing contracts for reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 6503, The World Bank.
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