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Delegation and motivation

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  • Lukas Angst
  • Karol Borowiecki

Abstract

We investigate the determinants of decision rights transfer and its effects on the motivation of an agent. The study is based on a laboratory experiment conducted on 130 subjects playing an innovative principal–agent game. Interestingly, the results show that agents do not favour a delegation and a decision is considered rather burdensome. Although the experiment could not give support for the behavioural hypothesis of higher effort provided by participants who receive choice subsequently, the survey illuminates the interaction between delegation motives, effort motivators, goals and other perceptions of the agents. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Lukas Angst & Karol Borowiecki, 2014. "Delegation and motivation," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 76(3), pages 363-393, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:76:y:2014:i:3:p:363-393
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-013-9370-7
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organizational behaviour; Incentives; Experiments and contracts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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