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A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process

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  • James Miller

Abstract

This paper has argued that changing technology has increased opportunities for voter participation in the legislative process and has presented a proposal which takes some advantage of such possibilities. The objective has not been so much to criticize our present legislative voting arrangement, but to suggest for the future an alternative that might prove superior. The New Left balks at the “establishment”, and conservatives look with dismay upon the “liberal clique”. Direct participation largely would solve these problems, by-passing intermediaries and allowing direct voter or voter-proxy approval of all legislation. If we accept the principal that, with constitutional guarantees, qualified individuals should determine as democratically and as directly as possible the decisions that affect their personal and corporate welfare, then the future holds opportunities for greater efficiency in collective action. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1969

Suggested Citation

  • James Miller, 1969. "A program for direct and proxy voting in the legislative process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 107-113, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:7:y:1969:i:1:p:107-113
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718736
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    Cited by:

    1. Dennis Mueller & Robert Tollison & Thomas Willett, 1972. "Representative democracy via random selection," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 57-68, March.
    2. Dhillon, Amrita & Kotsialou, Grammateia & Xefteris, Dimitris, 2021. "Information Aggregation with Delegation of Votes," SocArXiv ubk7p, Center for Open Science.
    3. Martin Shubik, 1970. "On homo politicus and the instant referendum," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 79-84, September.
    4. Grammateia Kotsialou & Luke Riley, 2018. "Incentivising Participation in Liquid Democracy with Breadth-First Delegation," Papers 1811.03710, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2019.
    5. G. Philpotts, 1975. "The private allocation of public funds," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 25-34, September.
    6. Kuehn, Daniel, 2021. "James Buchanan, Gordon Tullock, and the “Radically Irresponsible” One Person, One Vote Decisions," OSF Preprints zetq4, Center for Open Science.
    7. Dennis Mueller & Geoffrey Philpotts & Jaroslav Vanek, 1972. "The social gains from exchanging votes: A simulation approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 55-79, September.
    8. Dimitrios Karoukis, 2021. "Deliberative Democracy with Dilutive Voting Power Sharing," Papers 2109.01436, arXiv.org, revised Apr 2022.
    9. Jacqueline Harding, 2023. "Proxy Selection in Transitive Proxy Voting," Papers 2307.02627, arXiv.org.
    10. Jacqueline Harding, 2022. "Proxy selection in transitive proxy voting," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(1), pages 69-99, January.
    11. Pivato, Marcus & Soh, Arnold, 2020. "Weighted representative democracy," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(C), pages 52-63.
    12. James Green-Armytage, 2015. "Direct voting and proxy voting," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 26(2), pages 190-220, June.
    13. Hans Gersbach, 2022. "New Forms of Democracy," CESifo Working Paper Series 10134, CESifo.

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