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Campaigns, political mobility, and communication

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  • Hans Gersbach

Abstract

We study the interdependence between campaign contributions, the candidates’ positions, and electoral outcomes. In our model, a candidate who moves away from his firmly established position towards a more risky one generates costs for the voters. Campaign contributions allow the candidates to reduce these mobility costs. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns, two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. Interest groups may finance candidates whose position is far away from their own ideal point. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games, and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Suggested Citation

  • Hans Gersbach, 2014. "Campaigns, political mobility, and communication," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 161(1), pages 31-49, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:161:y:2014:i:1:p:31-49
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-013-0125-3
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    1. Hoferer, Moritz & Böttcher, Lucas & Herrmann, Hans J. & Gersbach, Hans, 2020. "The impact of technologies in political campaigns," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 538(C).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Campaign contributions; Interest groups; Run of donors; C72; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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