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Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens

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  • C. Lindsay
  • William Dougan

Abstract

This paper raises an old question and proposes a new answer. The question is, “Must public goods be produced by governments?” The consensus answer is “Yes,” on the grounds that transaction costs related to group size prevent all potential consumers of a public good from entering into voluntary arrangements to produce efficient levels of that good. Government intervention thus is required to achieve efficiency. Yet many obvious examples of public goods are not financed or even subsidized by government. Conspicuous examples of this phenomenon include the development of important innovations in technique in fields such as music (Bach and Beethoven), literature (Defoe, Dickens and Shakespeare, not excepting Homer or Adam Smith), and the visual arts (Cezanne), not to mention many crucial scientific discoveries. Indeed, the obvious public-good aspects of scientific knowledge induced many private societies to offer prizes for particular innovations. Two questions are raised by the private, voluntary provision of nonrival outputs or inputs: (1) what conditions contribute to this phenomenon, and (2) can voluntary provision come “close” to efficient provision? We suggest in this paper that, under certain conditions, the gains from many public goods whose benefits reach nationwide populations are largely realized at group sizes far smaller than even county or municipal jurisdictions. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2013

Suggested Citation

  • C. Lindsay & William Dougan, 2013. "Efficiency in the provision of pure public goods by private citizens," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 156(1), pages 31-43, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:156:y:2013:i:1:p:31-43
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9942-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Oakland, William H., 1987. "Theory of public goods," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 9, pages 485-535, Elsevier.
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    3. Harberger, Arnold C, 1984. "Basic Needs versus Distributional Weights in Social Cost-Benefit Analysis," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 32(3), pages 455-474, April.
    4. Tresch, Richard W., 2014. "Public Finance," Elsevier Monographs, Elsevier, edition 3, number 9780124158344.
    5. Harberger, Arnold C, 1971. "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics: An Interpretive Essay," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 9(3), pages 785-797, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Casey B. Mulligan, 2023. "Beyond Pigou: externalities and civil society in the supply–demand framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 1-18, July.
    2. Maxime Agbo & Agnes Zabsonre, 2023. "Why and how a well-intended (local) government can hide information from citizens for their own good: The case of public goods provision in less developed areas," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 43(1), pages 484-499.
    3. Mark Koyama, 2014. "The law & economics of private prosecutions in industrial revolution England," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 159(1), pages 277-298, April.
    4. Faruk Ülgen, 2015. "Social Provisioning and Financial Regulation: An Institutionalist-Minskyian Agenda for Reform," Journal of Economic Issues, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 49(2), pages 493-501, April.
    5. Quiroz Flores, Alejandro & Pfaff, Katharina, 2021. "Private provision of public goods and political survival: Rail transport in four European democracies in the 20th century," Research in Transportation Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    6. Saibal Kar & Srijan Banerjee, 2018. "Tax Evasion and Provision of Public Goods: Implications for Wage and Employment," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 6(1-2), pages 84-99, June.
    7. Sinclair Davidson & Jason Potts, 2016. "The Social Costs of Innovation Policy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3), pages 282-293, October.
    8. Joseph Michael Newhard, 2016. "A Note on the Market Provision of National Defense: Comment," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Summer 20), pages 79-86.
    9. Joseph Michael Newhard, 2016. "An Interest Group Theory of Public Goods Provision: Reassessing the Relative Efficiency of the Market and the State," Journal of Private Enterprise, The Association of Private Enterprise Education, vol. 31(Winter 20), pages 21-41.

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