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The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?

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  • Alexandre Couture Gagnon
  • Filip Palda

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Suggested Citation

  • Alexandre Couture Gagnon & Filip Palda, 2011. "The price of transparency: do campaign finance disclosure laws discourage political participation by citizens’ groups?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 146(3), pages 353-374, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:146:y:2011:i:3:p:353-374
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-010-9594-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sutton, John, 1996. "Technology and market structure," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 40(3-5), pages 511-530, April.
    2. Prat, Andrea, 2002. "Campaign Spending with Office-Seeking Politicians, Rational Voters, and Multiple Lobbies," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 103(1), pages 162-189, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandre Couture Gagnon, 2018. "Filip Palda: In memoriam," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 174(3), pages 213-217, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Campaign finance; Disclosure; Compliance cost; Entry barriers; D72; K20;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • K20 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - General

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