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Explaining cross-supplies

Author

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  • Pio Baake
  • Jörg Oechssler
  • Christoph Schenk

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Pio Baake & Jörg Oechssler & Christoph Schenk, 1999. "Explaining cross-supplies," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 37-60, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jeczfn:v:70:y:1999:i:1:p:37-60
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01226143
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Saloner, Garth, 1987. "Cournot duopoly with two production periods," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 183-187, June.
    2. Robert Z. Lawrence, 1993. "Japan's Different Trade Regime: An Analysis with Particular Reference to Seiretsu," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 7(3), pages 3-19, Summer.
    3. Toshihiro Matsumura, 1997. "A Two-stage Cournot Duopoly with Inventory Costs," The Japanese Economic Review, Japanese Economic Association, vol. 48(1), pages 81-89, January.
    4. Alexander Schrader & Stephen Martin, 1998. "Vertical Market Participation," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 13(3), pages 321-331, June.
    5. Auerbach, Alan J., 1985. "The theory of excess burden and optimal taxation," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-127, Elsevier.
    6. Michael A. Salinger, 1988. "Vertical Mergers and Market Foreclosure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 103(2), pages 345-356.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Luciano Fanti & Domenico Buccella & Luca Gori, 2023. "R&D subsidies in a duopoly market with outsourcing to the rival firm," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 100-110, January.
    2. Hans‐Theo Normann, 2001. "Exchange Agreements Facilitate Collusion," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 2(2), pages 113-125, May.
    3. Chen, Yutian & Dubey, Pradeep & Sen, Debapriya, 2011. "Outsourcing induced by strategic competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 484-492, July.
    4. Justin Marion, 2015. "Sourcing from the Enemy: Horizontal Subcontracting in Highway Procurement," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 63(1), pages 100-128, March.
    5. Yutian Chen, 2010. "Strategic Outsourcing between Rivals," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 11(2), pages 301-311, November.
    6. Hunold, Matthias & Muthers, Johannes, 2018. "Spatial Competition with Capacity Constraints and Subcontracting," DICE Discussion Papers 254, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), revised 2018.
    7. Andrea Pierce & Debapriya Sen, 2014. "Outsourcing versus technology transfer: Hotelling meets Stackelberg," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(3), pages 263-287, April.
    8. Fang, Debin & Wang, Jiancheng, 2020. "Horizontal capacity sharing between asymmetric competitors," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    9. John William Hatfield & Scott Duke Kominers & Alexandru Nichifor & Michael Ostrovsky & Alexander Westkamp, 2013. "Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in Trading Networks," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 121(5), pages 966-1005.
    10. Matthias Hunold & Kai Hüschelrath & Ulrich Laitenberger & Johannes Muthers, 2020. "Competition, Collusion, and Spatial Sales Patterns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(4), pages 737-779, December.
    11. Yutian Chen, 2011. "Strategic sourcing for entry deterrence and tacit collusion," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 102(2), pages 137-156, March.
    12. Shy, Oz & Stenbacka, Rune, 2003. "Strategic outsourcing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 203-224, February.
    13. Muthers, Johannes & Hunold, Matthias, 2017. "Capacity constrained price competition with transportation costs," VfS Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168248, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    14. Hunold, Matthias & Muthers, Johannes, 2019. "Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(C).
    15. Liang Guo & Xiaole Wu, 2018. "Capacity Sharing Between Competitors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(8), pages 3554-3573, August.
    16. Antelo, Manel & Bru, Lluís, 2021. "Horizontal contracts in a dominant firm-competitive fringe model," MPRA Paper 105774, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Arya, Anil & Mittendorf, Brian & Sappington, David E.M., 2008. "Outsourcing, vertical integration, and price vs. quantity competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 1-16, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    cross-supplies; subcontracting; Stackelberg; L13; L22;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure

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