IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/jecinq/v3y2005i3p221-241.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Racial conflict and the malignancy of identity

Author

Listed:
  • Kaushik Basu

Abstract

This paper demonstrates how our sense of identity can emerge out of mere markers of social distinction that may have no innate significance, but, nevertheless, spread to various aspects of our lives and be the root of conflict. The basis of such conflicts could arise from the use of race to form conditional judgments about people's behavior. Moreover, there are contexts where racial conflict is inevitable even though, if individuals had common knowledge of one another's preferences, there would be no conflict. It is argued that this kind of conflict, where many individuals have no innate aggressive preference, is widespread and understanding the process that gives rise to such conflict is the key to crafting effective policy that contains it.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Kaushik Basu, 2005. "Racial conflict and the malignancy of identity," The Journal of Economic Inequality, Springer;Society for the Study of Economic Inequality, vol. 3(3), pages 221-241, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:3:y:2005:i:3:p:221-241
    DOI: 10.1007/s10888-005-9002-8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s10888-005-9002-8
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10888-005-9002-8?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369.
    2. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    3. Jörgen W. Weibull, 2004. "Testing Game Theory," Palgrave Macmillan Books, in: Steffen Huck (ed.), Advances in Understanding Strategic Behaviour, chapter 6, pages 85-104, Palgrave Macmillan.
    4. Roland G. Fryer & Matthew O. Jackson, 2002. "Categorical Cognition: A Psychological Model of Categories and Identification in Decision Making," Microeconomics 0211002, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Andreoni, James & Samuelson, Larry, 2006. "Building rational cooperation," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 127(1), pages 117-154, March.
    6. Jorgen W. Weibull, 1997. "Evolutionary Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262731215, April.
    7. David Austen-Smith & Roland G. Fryer, 2003. "The Economics of 'Acting White'," NBER Working Papers 9904, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Una Okonkwo Osili & Anna L. Paulson, 2004. "Institutional quality and financial market development: evidence from international migrants in the U.S," Working Paper Series WP-04-19, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Kaushik Basu, 2016. "Beyond the Invisible Hand: Groundwork for a New Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9299.
    2. Christoph Kuzmics & Daniel Rodenburger, 2020. "A case of evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium in the laboratory," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 70(3), pages 685-721, October.
    3. Yuval Heller & Christoph Kuzmics, 2019. "Renegotiation and Coordination with Private Values," Graz Economics Papers 2019-10, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    4. Panagiotis Kyriazis & Edmund Lou, 2022. "The Signaling Role of Leaders in Global Games," Papers 2209.12426, arXiv.org, revised Jul 2023.
    5. Jiayang Li & Zhaoran Wang & Yu Marco Nie, 2023. "Wardrop Equilibrium Can Be Boundedly Rational: A New Behavioral Theory of Route Choice," Papers 2304.02500, arXiv.org, revised Feb 2024.
    6. José Pedro Pontes, 2003. "Industrial Clusters and Peripheral Areas," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 35(11), pages 2053-2068, November.
    7. Casoria, Fortuna & Ciccone, Alice, 2021. "Do upfront investments increase cooperation? A laboratory experiment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 140(C).
    8. Vinícius Ferraz & Thomas Pitz, 2024. "Analyzing the Impact of Strategic Behavior in an Evolutionary Learning Model Using a Genetic Algorithm," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 63(2), pages 437-475, February.
    9. Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "The role of warnings in regulation: keeping control with less punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(12), pages 2801-2816, December.
    10. Guth, Werner & Pull, Kerstin, 2004. "Will equity evolve?: an indirect evolutionary approach," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 273-282, March.
    11. Lauren Larrouy & Guilhem Lecouteux, 2018. "Choosing in a Large World: The Role of Focal Points as a Mindshaping Device," Working Papers halshs-01923244, HAL.
    12. Kim, Minseong & Kim, Young-Han, 2013. "When does coordination for free trade regimes fail?," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 31-36.
    13. Basu, Kaushik & Weibull, Jörgen W., 2002. "Punctuality - A Cultural Trait as Equilibrium," Working Paper Series 582, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    14. Heller, Yuval & Kuzmics, Christoph, 2024. "Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 143(C), pages 51-76.
    15. Panagiotis Kyriazis & Edmund Lou, 2023. "It's Not Always the Leader's Fault: How Informed Followers Can Undermine Efficient Leadership," Papers 2307.13841, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    16. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2000. "Global Games: Theory and Applications," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1275, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    17. Jorge Andrés Gallego, 2007. "La reciprocidad y la paradoja del votante," Revista de Economía Institucional, Universidad Externado de Colombia - Facultad de Economía, vol. 9(16), pages 149-188, January-J.
    18. Jorg Oechssler & Karl Schlag, 1997. "An Evolutionary Analysis of Bagwell's Example," Game Theory and Information 9704001, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 11 Apr 1997.
    19. Sylvain Chassang & Gerard Padró I Miquel, 2010. "Conflict and Deterrence Under Strategic Risk," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 125(4), pages 1821-1858.
    20. Antecol, Heather & Cobb-Clark, Deborah A., 2008. "Identity and racial harassment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 66(3-4), pages 529-557, June.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    C72; D74; D80; Z10;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions
    • D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
    • Z10 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:jecinq:v:3:y:2005:i:3:p:221-241. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.