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The Impact of Legislative Tenure and Seniority on General Election Success: Econometric Evidence from U.S. House Races

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  • Christopher Duquette
  • Franklin Mixon
  • Richard Cebula

Abstract

The last four election-cycles in the U.S. House of Representatives (2004–2010) witnessed two shifts in political party control of that legislative body—from the Republicans to the Democrats in 2006 and then back to the Republicans in 2010. Nevertheless, U.S. House incumbents of both parties running for re-election tended to enjoy a sizeable advantage over their general-election challengers during the period. The advantage is even greater for incumbents who are members of the leadership, key committees, or have lengthy tenure. Our results show that, ceteris paribus, membership in the House leadership is worth on average 6.8 percentage points towards the incumbent’s expected vote-share, and that membership in either of the two top committees is worth an additional 1.3 such percentage points. A ten-term incumbent can expect another 2.0 percentage points of vote share. Lastly, our results also indicate the existence of a wave effect favoring Democratic incumbents in 2006, and a slightly smaller wave effect favoring Republican incumbents in 2010. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2013

Suggested Citation

  • Christopher Duquette & Franklin Mixon & Richard Cebula, 2013. "The Impact of Legislative Tenure and Seniority on General Election Success: Econometric Evidence from U.S. House Races," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 41(2), pages 161-172, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:atlecj:v:41:y:2013:i:2:p:161-172
    DOI: 10.1007/s11293-012-9355-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Legislative tenure; Legislator seniority; Incumbency; Elections; D70; D72;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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