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Political determinants of social expenditures in Greece: an empirical analysis

Author

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  • Ebru Canikalp

    (Cukurova University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Public Finance, Saricam, Adana, Turkey)

  • Ilter Unlukaplan

    (Cukurova University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Department of Public Finance, Saricam, Adana, Turkey)

Abstract

A view prominently expounded is that the interaction between the composition and the volume of public expenditures is directly affected by political, institutional, psephological and ideological indicators. A crucial component of public expenditures, social expenditures play an important role in the economy as they directly and indirectly affect the distribution of income and wealth. Social expenditures aim at reallocating income and wealth unequal distribution. These expenditures comprise cash benefits, direct in-kind provision of goods and services, and tax breaks with social purposes. The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between political structure, i.e. government fragmentation, ideological composition, elections and so on, and the social expenditures in Greece. Employing data from the Comparative Political Dataset (CPDS) and the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX), a time series analysis was conducted for Greece for the 1980-2014 period. The findings of the study indicate that voter turnout, spending on the elderly population and the number of government changes have positive and statistically significant effects on social expenditures in Greece while debt stock and cabinet composition have negative effects.

Suggested Citation

  • Ebru Canikalp & Ilter Unlukaplan, 2017. "Political determinants of social expenditures in Greece: an empirical analysis," Public Sector Economics, Institute of Public Finance, vol. 41(3), pages 359-377.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipf:psejou:v:41:y:2017:i:3:p:359-377
    DOI: 10.3326/pse.41.3.5
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    social expenditures; political indicators; time series analyses;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • D7 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making
    • H53 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Welfare Programs
    • I3 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty

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