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Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set

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Abstract

We provide a mechanism that approximately implements the Mas-Colell bargaining set in subgame perfect equilibrium. The mechanism is based on the definition of the Mas-Colell bargaining set, and respects feasibility in and out of equilibrium. (Copyright: Fundación Empresa Pública)

Suggested Citation

  • Roberto Serrano & Rajiv Vohra, 2002. "Implementing the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(2), pages 285-298, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:iec:inveco:v:26:y:2002:i:2:p:285-298
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Ezra Einy & David Wettstein, 1999. "A non-cooperative interpretation of bargaining sets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 4(3), pages 219-230.
    2. Perez-Castrillo, David & Wettstein, David, 2000. "Implementation of Bargaining Sets via Simple Mechanisms," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 106-120, April.
    3. Dutta, Bhaskar & Ray, Debraj & Sengupta, Kunal & Vohra, Rajiv, 1989. "A consistent bargaining set," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 93-112, October.
    4. Vohra, Rajiv, 1991. "An existence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 19-34.
    5. Serrano, Roberto & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Bargaining and Bargaining Sets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 292-308, May.
    6. Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1989. "An equivalence theorem for a bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 129-139, April.
    7. Zhou Lin, 1994. "A New Bargaining Set of an N-Person Game and Endogenous Coalition Formation," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 512-526, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Roberto Serrano, 2005. "Fifty years of the Nash program, 1953-2003," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 29(2), pages 219-258, May.
    2. Borm, Peter & Ju, Yuan & Wettstein, David, 2015. "Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 236-254.
    3. Benoit, Jean Pierre & Ok, Efe A. & Sanver, M. Remzi, 2007. "On combining implementable social choice rules," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 20-30, July.
    4. Hervés-Estévez, Javier & Moreno-García, Emma, 2018. "Bargaining set with endogenous leaders: A convergence result," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 10-13.
    5. Hu, Cheng-Cheng, 2007. "A noncooperative interpretation of the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 54(3), pages 203-217, December.
    6. Hu, Cheng-Cheng, 2010. "A noncooperative approach to the Mas-Colell bargaining set," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 884-892, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Mas-Colell bargaining set; implementation; approximate implementation; subgame perfect equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies

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