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Turnover by Non-CEO Executives in Top Management Teams and Escalation of Commitment

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  • Dmitriy Chulkov

    (School of Business, Indiana University, 2300 S Washington St, Kokomo, IN 46902, USA)

Abstract

This article investigates the relationship between the decision-making bias known as escalation of commitment and the turnover of non-CEO executives in top management teams. The phenomenon of escalation of commitment is observed when decision makers persist with business investments that have a low likelihood of success. Theoretical explanations for the association between executive turnover and escalation include self-justification and reputation protection. Top managers may conceal prior errors, escalate commitment to earlier decisions, and exit the organization before the outcome of decisions is observed. Successor managers do not have a commitment to earlier decisions and have the capability to stop investments that are discovered to be failing. Empirical analysis utilizing a sample of over 1600 U.S. firms confirms that departures by non-CEO executives from top management teams are associated with an increased likelihood of new reporting of discontinued operations and extraordinary items by firms and a reduction in the firms’ performances relative to their industry. These effects reflect de-escalation activities and are amplified in the years concurrent with and following a joint departure of multiple management team members. Prior empirical studies on escalation and de-escalation behavior focused on CEO turnover. The contribution of this article is its documenting of the key role of non-CEO managers and team turnover in the context of escalation.

Suggested Citation

  • Dmitriy Chulkov, 2024. "Turnover by Non-CEO Executives in Top Management Teams and Escalation of Commitment," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 17(5), pages 1-11, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:gam:jjrfmx:v:17:y:2024:i:5:p:195-:d:1391922
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Barron, John M. & Chulkov, Dmitriy V. & Waddell, Glen R., 2011. "Top management team turnover, CEO succession type, and strategic change," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 64(8), pages 904-910, August.
    2. Dmitriy Chulkov & Xiaoqiong Wang, 2023. "Corporate social responsibility and financial reporting quality: evidence from US firms," Studies in Economics and Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 40(3), pages 445-466, January.
    3. Ann K. Buchholtz & Michael Lubatkin & Hugh O'Neill, 1999. "Seller Responsiveness to the need to divest," Post-Print hal-02311653, HAL.
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